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I. INTRODUCTION

“Any time you go through a process of major social change,
you have four stages of response. The first is anger; the second is
retribution; the third is grudging acceptance. In the fourth stage,
1
people all of a sudden get it . . . .”
While this quote by Donna Lopiano is related to the
acceptance of women in sports and the effect of Title IX, it could
apply equally to the response of legislatures and courts to domestic
violence over the last twenty-five years. Given the historical
condonation of such violence by the U.S. legal system, we are
indeed going through a process of major social change as we
advocate for the same system to take a stand against domestic
violence. In the custody arena, laws first allowing, then mandating
that courts consider domestic abuse, and most recently creating
presumptions against batterers as custodial parents, have met with
very mixed results. While some states seem to have made this
transition without significant problems, other states have seen a
backlash in the courts’ response to such presumptions.
This article will examine the effect of state statutes creating a
rebuttable presumption against custody to batterers. Part II will
trace the development of these presumption statutes, situating
them within historical trends in custody law. Part III will describe
the statutes, including how they vary. Part IV will examine how the
presumption statutes are being implemented, including the
backlash seen in some jurisdictions. Part V will propose solutions
to problems with implementation of presumption statutes. These
include legislative amendments; training for judges, attorneys,
guardians ad litem, mediators, and evaluators; seeking clarification
from appellate courts; funding for attorneys for indigent victims of
1. Bill Blum, Fighting Over Title IX, CAL. LAW. Feb. 2001, at 90 (quoting
Donna Lopiano, Executive Director, Women’s Sports Foundation).
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domestic violence; and community organizing. The conclusion,
Part VI, notes that while the passage of such statutes is not a “quick
fix” to the fundamental problems presented by these cases, the
process of enactment and implementation of the presumption
statutes is worthwhile, as another step on the long road toward the
elimination of domestic violence.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION STATUTES
A. Historical Custody Standards
Until the 1970s and the advent of no-fault divorce, abuse by
one parent of the other was considered quite relevant to custody
decisions throughout the United States, as this was evidence of the
2
abuser’s poor morals. While the rate of divorce was low, victims of
domestic violence were usually awarded custody of the parties’
3
children.
A significant change in custody decisions took place in the
1970s, as most U.S. states amended their divorce laws from fault4
based divorce to no-fault divorce.
Under the new regime,
domestic violence was no longer seen as relevant by divorce courts;
judges were trained to look toward the future, not admit evidence
of past misdeeds, and to consider the parents as generally equally
5
qualified to be custodians of children. Unless the children were
6
physically harmed, what a husband did to his wife was not seen as
7
relevant to his ability to parent.
No-fault divorce was generally hailed as a progressive move,
2. Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images Of Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic
Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041, 1043 (1991).
3. Id.
4. Id. See also Note, Developments in the Law: Legal Response to Domestic Violence,
VI. Battered Women and Child Custody Decisionmaking, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1597, 1597
(1993).
5. Lynne R. Kurtz, Protecting New York’s Children: An Argument for the Creation
of a Rebuttable Presumption Against Awarding a Spouse Abuser Custody of a Child, 60
ALB. L. REV. 1345, 1347 (1997).
6. While domestic violence can be committed by either sex, most domestic
violence is committed by men against women. The U.S. Dept. of Justice reported
in 1998 that a woman is seven to fourteen times more likely to be severely injured
by an intimate than a man is. Patricia Tjaden & Nancy Thoennes, Full Report of the
Prevalence, Incidence, and Consequences of Violence Against Women: Findings From the
National Violence Against Women Survey, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, at
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/172837.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2001).
7. Cahn, supra note 2, at 1044; Kurtz, supra note 5, at 1347.
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both by feminists and by fathers’ rights groups. Fathers’ rights
groups celebrated this as a move away from what they saw as gender
bias, whereby mothers were allegedly awarded custody solely by
virtue of their sex. However, the emphasis on no longer making
findings of fault set the stage for courts refusing to consider
domestic violence as a relevant factor in custody decisions.
Domestic violence was not seen as affecting the best interests of the
9
child unless the child was also physically abused. And even though
the overlap between partner abuse and physical child abuse is
10
great, courts often failed to acknowledge this connection in
11
making custody decisions.
B. Move To Allow, Then Require Courts To Consider Domestic
Violence In Custody Decisions
By the 1980’s, the domestic violence movement had become a
vocal presence, and was developing some sophistication in terms of
changing entrenched policies. Advocates began to call for
12
legislators and courts to protect children from batterers.
Feminists stressed the harmful effects of exposure to domestic
violence on children, and stated that it is not actually possible to be
13
a violent husband and a good father.
At the same time, there was a strong trend toward trying to
keep fathers close to their children. Father’s rights groups pushed
for, and succeeded in getting, legislation stressing the importance
14
of joint custody. Families were no longer seen as “broken,” but
8. LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION (1985); MICHAEL
WHEELER, NO-FAULT DIVORCE (1974); Erin R. Melnick, Reaffirming No-Fault Divorce:
Supplementing Formal Equality with Substantive Change, 75 IND. L. J. 711, 714 (2000);
Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its
Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1987). See generally, Herma Hill Kay, An Appraisal
of California’s No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 291 (1987); Howard Krom,
California’s Divorce Law Reform: A Historical Analysis, 1 PAC. L. J. 156 (1970).
9. Charlotte Germane et al., Mandatory Custody Mediation and Joint Custody
Orders in California: The Danger for Victims of Domestic Violence, 1 WOMEN’S L.J. 175,
179 (1985).
10. PETER G. JAFFE ET AL., CHILDREN OF BATTERED WOMEN, 20-21 (1990); see
infra note 35 (citing social science literature about effects of domestic violence on
children).
11. Germane et al., supra note 9.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Nancy K. Lemon, Joint Custody as a Statutory Presumption: California’s New
Civil Code Sections 4600 and 4600.5, 11 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 485, 505, 510, 516
(1981); Germane et al., supra note 9, at 181-182.
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instead were “in transition,” with the goal being that both parents
15
were still involved in their children’s lives. In some cases, courts
gave fathers more time with their children than they had generally
spent with them while living with the children’s mother; in these
cases the goal was not merely to continue the father/child
relationship, but to try to strengthen it.
Legislatures started to respond to both these groups. Some
states enacted laws stating that domestic violence could be taken
into account in making custody decisions, but leaving the decision
16
up to the judge whether or not to even admit such evidence.
Other states went further, actually mandating that judges consider
17
domestic violence.
A few states passed laws stating that perpetration of domestic
18
violence was detrimental to children. Others required that judges
state their reasons for awarding custody to alleged or proven
19
batterers on the record or make findings of fact that joint custody
is not detrimental to the children despite the violence, if joint
20
custody were granted in a domestic violence case.
Meanwhile, many states were also enacting laws allowing for or
preferring joint custody of children.
Some states created
21
presumptions favoring joint custody if the parents agreed to it or
22
required judges to state their reasons for denying joint custody.
In all too many cases, these two trends worked at cross23
purposes. Given the high rates of domestic violence in the U.S.,
24
especially among divorcing couples, there were many cases in
15. Germane et al., supra note 9, at 181-82.
16. See Barbara J. Hart, Custody and Visitation Decision-Making When There are
Allegations of Domestic Violence, at http://www.mincava.umn.edu/hart/telecon.htm.
17. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.090 (Michie 2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3109.04 (West 2000).
18. The Family Violence Project of the Nat. Council of Juv. & Fam. Ct. Judges,
Family Violence in Child Custody Statutes: An Analysis of State Codes and Legal Practice,
29 FAM. L. Q. 199, 225-227 (1995)[hereinafter Family Violence Project].
19. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011 (West 1994), N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
458:17(II)(c) (1992).
20. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17(II)(c) (1992); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3109.04 (West 2000).
21. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56a (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
458:17(II)(c)(1992); see also Lemon, supra note 14, at 500 (discussing the
legislative history of the first joint custody statute in the U.S.).
22. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56a (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
458:17(II)(c) (1992).
23. Tjaden & Thoennes, supra note 6.
24. Estimates of the incidence of wife-beating range from at least one in three
marriages to up to one-half of all marriages. M. STRAUS ET AL., BEHIND CLOSED
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which courts were presented with one parent arguing for joint
custody and the other parent arguing that the history of domestic
violence should preclude such a decision. Starting in 1991, some
states resolved this conflict by enacting statutes creating a
25
presumption against custody to batterers.
III. INCREASING SUPPORT FOR ENACTMENT OF REBUTTABLE
PRESUMPTIONS AGAINST CUSTODY TO BATTERERS
A. Policy Statements
There were several bases for this new trend. The first U.S.
national policy statement supporting a rebuttable presumption in
domestic violence cases was H. R. Congressional Resolution 172: “It
is the sense of Congress that, for purposes of determining child
custody, credible evidence of physical abuse of a spouse should
create a statutory presumption that it is detrimental to the child to
26
be placed in the custody of the abusive spouse.” While Congress
does not have the authority to tell states how to handle custody
decisions, this Resolution was intended to encourage states to pass
their own statutes establishing such presumptions.
In 1994, the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court
Judges released the Model Code on Domestic and Family
27
Violence.
This Code was developed in conjunction with
legislators, the American Bar Association, the American Medical
Association, domestic violence experts, prosecutors, and defense
28
counsel over a period of three years. Section 401 of the Model
Code states:
In every proceeding where there is at issue a dispute as to
DOORS: VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY 31 (1980); Eisenberg & Micklow, The
Assaulted Wife: ‘Catch 22’ Revisited, 3 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 138 (1977); Laurie
Woods, Litigation on Behalf of Battered Women, 7 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 39, 41 (1981).
See also HOFF ET AL., INTERSTATE CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES AND PARENTAL
KIDNAPPING: POLICY, PRACTICE AND LAW 3-15 (1982) (scope of wife battering and
the extent of underreporting).
25. Family Violence Project, supra note 18, at 208.
26. H.R.J. Res. 172, 101st Cong. (1994) (sponsored by Rep. Constance
Morella and passed unanimously on Oct. 25, 1990).
27. NAT. COUNCIL OF JUV. AND FAM. CT. JUDGES, MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC
AND FAMILY VIOLENCE (1994),[hereinafter MODEL CODE].
28. Christine L. Bailey & Maureen Sheeran, The Model Code on Domestic and
Family Violence: A Call for Legislative Action and Community Response, NEV. PUB. AFF.
REV. 24 (Legis. Issues: 1995).
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the custody of a child, a determination by the court that
domestic or family violence has occurred raises a
rebuttable presumption that it is detrimental to the child
and not in the best interest of the child to be placed in
sole custody, joint legal custody, or joint physical custody
29
with the perpetrator of family violence.
The American Bar Association (ABA) passed a resolution in
August 1989 that joint custody is inappropriate in cases in which
spouse abuse, child abuse, or parental kidnapping is likely to
30
occur.
In 1994, the ABA published a report to its president
suggesting the adoption of statutes creating a presumption against
31
custody to batterers. In July 2000 the ABA adopted new policy
statements with respect to domestic violence and custody, and
recommended that states and lawyers take action to provide for the
safety of adult and child domestic violence victims during visitation
32
and visitation exchanges.
In 1996, the American Psychological Association also
recommended that states adopt such statutes:
In matters of custody, preference should be given to the
nonviolent parent whenever possible, and unsupervised
visitation should not be granted to the perpetrator until
an offender-specific treatment program is successfully
completed, or the offender proves that he is no longer a
threat to the physical and emotional safety of the child
33
and the other parent.
Similarly, the Uniform Adoption Act provides for terminating
a father’s rights if “the respondent has been convicted of a crime of
violence or of violating a restraining or protective order, and the
facts of the crime or violation and the respondent’s behavior
indicate that the respondent is unfit to maintain a relationship of

29.
30.

MODEL CODE, supra note 28, § 410, at 33.
A.B.A. HOUSE OF DELEGATES, APPROVED RESOLUTIONS RELATED TO
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (1989); see also A.B.A. Model Joint Custody Statute, 15 FAM. L.
REV. 1494, 1495 (1989)(requiring courts to consider domestic violence in making
joint custody awards).
31. Howard Davidson, THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON CHILDREN: A
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE A.B.A. (1994).
32. Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law:
Redefining Families, Reforming Custody Jurisdiction, and Refining Support Issues, 34 FAM.
L.Q. 607, 626 (Winter, 2001). For content of new A.B.A. policies, see
http://www.abanet.org (last visited Oct. 3, 2001).
33. A.B.A., VIOLENCE AND THE FAMILY, 99 (1996).
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34

parent and child with the minor . . . .”
1. Social Science Literature

Another reason statutes establishing a presumption against
custody to batterers were enacted was the growing body of social
science literature showing the often severe and long-lasting effects
35
of domestic violence on children. This literature also argued that
joint custody was contraindicated when there has been family
36
violence.
2. Mothers Losing Custody
Furthermore, studies and articles started to show that when
fathers in general or batterers in particular fought for custody, they
37
usually won. There are also many cases in which mothers initially
34.
35.

UNIFORM ADOPTION ACT § 3-504 (1994).
ENDING THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE: COMMUNITY RESPONSES TO CHILDREN OF
BATTERED WOMEN (E. Peled et al., eds., 1995); P.G. JAFFE ET AL., CHILDREN OF
BATTERED WOMEN (1990); D.A. Wolfe et al., Children of Battered Women: The Relation
of Child Behavior to Family Violence and Maternal Stress, 53 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 657 (1985); N.Z. Hilton, Battered Women’s Concerns About their Children
Witnessing Wife Assault, 7 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 77 (1992); J.R. Johnston &
L.E.G. Campbell, Parent-child Relationships in Domestic Violence Families Disputing
Custody, 31 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 282, 282-83 (1993); M. Roy, Children in
the Crossfire, HEALTH COMM. (1988); P.G. Jaffe et al., Child Witnesses of Woman Abuse:
How Can Schools Respond?, 14 RESPONSE TO VICTIMIZATION OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN
12 (1992); D. G. Saunders, Child Custody Decisions in Families Experiencing Wife Abuse,
39 SOC. WORK 51 (1994).
36. L. Crites & D. Coker, What Therapists See That Judges May Miss: A Unique
Guide to Custody Decisions When Spouse Abuse is Charged, JUDGES J. 9-13 (Spring,
1988); Germane et al., supra note 9; M. D. Pagelow, Justice for Victims of Spouse Abuse
in Divorce and Child Custody Cases, 8 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 69 (1993); Pauline
Quirion, Increased Protection for Children from Violent Homes: The Presumption Against
Awarding Child Custody to a Batterer, 16 MASS. FAM. L. J. 67 (1998); Saunders, supra
note 35, at 56 (citing R. E. Emery and M. M. Wyer, Divorce Mediation, 42 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 472 (1987)).
37. Pagelow, supra note 36 (citing R. Geffner & M. Pagelow, Victims of Spouse
Abuse, in TREATMENT OF FAMILY VIOLENCE: A SOURCEBOOK 81-97 (R. T. Ammerman
& M. Hersen, eds.) (1990)); L. A. Marks, Mandatory Mediation of Family Law and
Domestic Violence Cases, NCADV VOICE, 18-22 (Winter, 1988); M. B. Liss & G. B.
Stahly, Domestic Violence and Child Custody, in BATTERING AND FAMILY THERAPY: A
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE 175 (M. Hansen & M. Harway, eds., 1993); J. Zorza, Protecting
the Children: Custody Disputes When One Parent Abuses the Other, 29 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 1113 (April 1996) (citing R. I. ABRAMS AND J. M. GREANEY, REPORT OF THE
GENDER BIAS STUDY OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT [OF MASSACHUSETTS] 62-63
(1989) that stated fathers won in seventy percent of contested custody cases and
noting that this report also cites similar findings from California and the entire
nation); M. A. Mason & A. Quirk, Are Mothers Losing Custody? Read My Lips: Trends
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or eventually lost custody due to their inability to get along with the
fathers. In some of these, in which there were no allegations of
partner abuse, the court first awarded joint custody, then found
after awhile that this was unworkable due to continued conflict
38
between the parents.
In other cases, there was extensive evidence of partner abuse.
The fact that a formerly battered mother and her former batterer
are not able to co-parent effectively is not at all surprising.
However, it is very unfortunate that many courts are still so
unaware of how domestic violence dynamics enter into custody
cases. One wonders why the court ever expected people in this
situation to suddenly be able to cooperate.
An example of such a case is found in In re Marriage of
39
Devilbiss.
In that case, the evidence included fifteen police
reports, testimony by the daughter that the father used to hit the
40
mother, and allegations that he also choked the daughter.
However, the court ignored this evidence in its order changing the
41
Under this
joint custody order to “rotating custody.”
arrangement, the daughter was ordered to live with her mother for
42
seven months each year and with her father for five months. The
court noted that the parents had not been able to cooperate as
43
required by the joint custody order. Another example is found in

in Judicial Decision-Making in Custody Disputes—1920, 1960, 1990, and 1995, 31 FAM.
L. Q. 215 (1997) (citing a study finding that fathers won in sixty-three percent of
contested custody cases, Lisa Genasci, Increasingly, Working Mothers Lose in Custody
Fights, L.A. TIMES, January 20, 1995, at D8); Mary Lynne Vellinga, Custody Laws
Under Fire: Parents Who Batter Often Allowed to Retain Joint Care, SACRAMENTO BEE,
March 23, 1997, at A1.
38. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Cobb, 988 P.2d 272, 273 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999)
(court briefly mentions without comment allegations that father abused child,
then changed joint custody award to sole custody to father due to parents’ inability
to co-parent); Brown v. Brown, 19 S.W.3d 717, 722-23 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000)(without
any allegations of abuse, the court modified the joint custody arrangement to sole
custody to the father because of the mother’s unwillingness to co-parent and that
the father is best suited to make decisions in the best interests of the child);
Thomas v. Thomas, 991 P.2d 7, 10 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999) (noting no allegations of
abuse, the court changed joint custody to sole to father due to parents’ inability to
co-parent).
39. 719 N.E.2d 375 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
40. Id. at 378-80.
41. Id. at 383.
42. Id. at 380 (affirming the trial court’s ruling that the daughter live with the
father from the first Saturday after the end of the school year to the first Saturday
of November).
43. Id. at 385.
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44

Canty v. Canty, in which the trial court modified the joint legal
and split physical custody award to sole physical custody with the
father, in spite of his admitting that he had committed domestic
45
violence on the mother. The appellate court upheld this order,
noting that the evidence of domestic violence was merely one
46
factor in the best interests analysis.
In all too many cases, batterers are in effect using the family
47
Instead of preventing this,
courts to re-victimize their victims.
courts sometimes collude with this behavior by awarding the
batterer joint custody, sole custody, or extensive unsupervised
visitation. While examining appellate cases decided in states
without such a presumption or before the enactment of the
presumption is beyond the scope of this article, it is noteworthy
that in many such cases judges clearly ignored extensive histories of
48
domestic violence in making custody decisions.
IV. DESCRIPTION OF STATUTES ESTABLISHING PRESUMPTIONS
AGAINST CUSTODY TO BATTERERS
A. Overview
In response to the growing body of policy statements, studies,
articles and cases, states started to adopt statutes establishing a
49
rebuttable presumption against custody to batterers.
As of
January 2001, there were sixteen states plus the District of

44. 874 P.2d 1000 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
45. Id. at 1005.
46. Arizona later amended its custody statute to provide that domestic
violence created a presumption against custody to the batterer. ARIZ. REV. STAT. §
25-403 (2000).
47. This problem is described at length in Leigh Goodmark, From Property to
Personhood: What the Legal System Should do for Children in Family Violence Cases, 102
W. VA. L. REV. 237 (1999). See also, Quirion, supra note 36, at 67.
48. See cases described in Goodmark, supra note 47, at 254-75. See also,
NANCY K. D. LEMON, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE & CHILDREN: RESOLVING CUSTODY AND
VISITATION DISPUTES, FAMILY VIOLENCE PREVENTION FUND, 39-40 (1995). But see
Bruscato v. Bruscato, 593 So. 2d 838 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (remanding case for
more thorough evaluation and retrial where batterer father was awarded sole
custody even though rebuttable presumption was not yet in effect).
49. For an argument in favor of the adoption of such a presumption in
Massachusetts, see Pauline Quirion et al., Commentary: Protecting Children Exposed To
Domestic Violence In Contested Custody And Visitation Litigation, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J.
501 (1997). A similar argument in New York is found in Kurtz, supra note 6, at
1346.
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In the summer of

50. These included Alabama, Arizona, California, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, and South Dakota. In Alabama, there
exists a rebuttable presumption that it is detrimental to child and not in best
interest of child to be placed in sole custody, joint legal custody, or joint physical
custody when court determines that domestic violence has occurred. ALA. CODE §
30-3-131 (1975). In addition, the state has a rebuttable presumption that it is in
the best interest of the child to reside with the parent who is not a perpetrator of
domestic or family violence. ALA. CODE § 30-3-133 (1975). The state of Arizona
makes it a rebuttable presumption that an award of custody to the parent who
committed the act of domestic violence is contrary to the child’s best interests, if
the court determines that a parent has committed an act of domestic violence
against the other parent; however, such presumption does not apply if both
parents have committed an act of domestic violence. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-403
(2000). California provides that a rebuttable presumption exists against sole or
joint physical or legal custody if the court finds that a party perpetrated domestic
violence. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044 (West Supp. 2001). The statute allows that this
presumption may be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. The
statute identifies factors to overcome the presumption. Id. In Delaware, there is a
rebuttable presumption that no perpetrator of domestic violence shall be awarded
sole or joint custody and a rebuttable presumption that no child shall primarily
reside with perpetrator of domestic violence. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 705A
(1999). This presumption is overcome by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
The statute identifies factors needed to overcome presumption. Id. Otherwise the
presumption may be overcome only if a judicial officer finds extraordinary
circumstances that warrant the rejection of the presumption. Id. The state of
Florida has a rebuttable presumption of detriment to the child and against
ordering shared parental responsibility, including visitation, residence of the
child, and decisions made regarding the child, if there is evidence that a parent
has been convicted of a felony of the third degree or higher involving domestic
violence. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13 (West 1997). Hawaii’s rebuttable presumption
statute provides that it is detrimental to the child and not in the best interest of
the child to be placed in sole custody, joint legal custody, or joint physical custody
if the court determines that family violence has been committed by a parent.
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-46 (Michie 1999). In Iowa, rebuttable presumption
exists against joint custody if the court finds a history of domestic abuse. IOWA
CODE ANN. § 598-41 (West Supp. 2001). This finding, if not rebutted, outweighs
any other factor in determining the award of custody. Id. Louisiana has a
presumption against sole or joint custody if a parent has a history of perpetrating
family violence. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:364 (West 2000). The court must find
that that one incident of family violence resulted in serious bodily injury or more
than one incident of family violence occurred before such a presumption can be
applied. Id. Such a presumption may be overcome by a preponderance of the
evidence. Id. This statute also identifies factors to overcome the presumption. Id.
Massachusetts has a rebuttable presumption that it is not in the best interests of
the child to be placed in sole custody, shared legal custody, or shared physical
custody with the abusive parent if court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that a pattern or serious incident of abuse has occurred, which may be overcome
by a preponderance of the evidence that such custody award is in the best interests
of the child. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. chs. 208 § 31A, 209 § 38, 209C § 10 (West
Supp. 2001). In Nevada, the statute provides that a rebuttable presumption that
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2001, Texas passed legislation strengthening its statute, creating a
rebuttable presumption against joint custody, sole custody, or
unsupervised visitation in cases of child abuse, child neglect, or
sole or joint custody with the perpetrator of domestic violence is not in the best
interests of the child if court determines after an evidentiary hearing and finding
by clear and convincing evidence that either parent or any other person seeking
custody has engaged in one or more acts of domestic violence. NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 125.480 (Michie Supp. 1999). The state also provides that there exists a
rebuttable presumption that sole or joint custody of the child by the perpetrator of
sexual assault is not in the best interest of the child if the person is convicted of
sexual assault and the parties later divorce. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §125C.210
(Michie Supp. 1999). In addition, there exists a rebuttable presumption that sole
or joint custody by the parent convicted of first degree murder of the other parent
is not in the best interest of the child and also includes a rebuttable presumption
that rights to visitation with the child by the parent convicted of first degree
murder of the other parent are not in the best interest of the child and must not
be granted if custody is not granted. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125C.220 (Michie
Supp. 1999). There is a rebuttable presumption that sole or joint custody by the
perpetrator of domestic violence is not in the best interest of the child, if after an
evidentiary hearing the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that either
parent or any other person seeking custody has engaged in one or more acts of
domestic violence against the child, a parent, or any other person residing with
the child. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125C.230 (Michie Supp. 1999). Nevada also
provides a rebuttable presumption that custody with the perpetrator of domestic
violence is not in the best interests of the child if court determines after an
evidentiary hearing and finding by clear and convincing evidence that either
parent or any other person seeking custody has engaged in one or more acts of
domestic violence. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432B.157 (Michie 2000). In North
Dakota, there is a rebuttable presumption that a parent who has perpetrated
domestic violence may not be awarded sole or joint custody if the court finds
credible evidence that domestic violence has occurred and there exists one
incident of domestic violence which resulted in serious bodily injury or involved
the use of a dangerous weapon or there exists a pattern of domestic violence
within a reasonable time proximate to the proceeding. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-0906.2 (1999). This presumption may be overcome only by clear and convincing
evidence that the best interests of the child require that parent’s participation as a
custodial parent. Id. Oklahoma’s rebuttable presumption statute provides that it
is not in the best interests of the child to have custody, guardianship or
unsupervised visitation granted to the abusive person if the occurrence of ongoing
domestic abuse is established by clear and convincing evidence. OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 43 § 112.2, tit. 10 § 21.1 (West 2001). In Oregon, there exists a rebuttable
presumption that it is not in the best interests and welfare of the child to award
sole or joint custody to the parent who committed abuse. OR. REV. STAT. §
107.137 (1989). In South Dakota, there is a rebuttable presumption that awarding
custody to the abusive parent is not in the best interests of the minor if the person
has been convicted of domestic abuse or assault against a person, other than a
person related by consanguinity, but not living in the same household. S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-45.5 (Michie 1999). In addition, there is a rebuttable
presumption that awarding custody or granting visitation to the parent convicted
for the death of the other parent, excluding vehicular homicide, is not in the best
interests of the minor. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-45.6 (Michie 1999).
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partner abuse, including sexual abuse resulting in the birth of the
51
Additionally, at this point, three states have adopted
child.
presumptions against joint custody in domestic violence cases or
considered the perpetration of domestic violence stronger than a
factor, but do not actually state a presumption against awarding
52
custody to the abusive parent.
These twenty states plus the District of Columbia are a
subgroup of the forty-eight jurisdictions that had adopted some
type of legislation regarding domestic violence as a custody factor
53
by the beginning of 2001. The only states without any statute
discussing this issue as of that date were Connecticut, Mississippi,
54
and Utah.
The presumption statutes vary greatly, in terms of 1) whether
the presumption applies to all types of custody or only to joint
custody; 2) how domestic violence is defined, that is what type of
evidence is required to trigger the presumption; 3) what
evidentiary standard is required to trigger the presumption; 4)
what type of evidence is required to rebut the presumption; and 5)
what evidentiary standard is required to rebut the presumption.
They also vary in terms of what the court is to do if both parents
appear to have been abusive, and what standard should be applied
if the presumption is found inapplicable.
51. See Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 586 (Vernon) (amending TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
153.004 (Vernon 1996)). See also Steve McGonigle, Girls’ Slayings Inspire Bill:
Unsupervised Visits Would Require Judge’s Approval, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May
available
at
26,
2001,
http://www.dallasnews.com/metro/stories/
377451_battaglia26me.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2001).
52. These included Colorado, Washington, and Wisconsin. In Colorado, if
the court makes a finding of fact that domestic violence has occurred, then it shall
not be in the bests interest of the child to allocate mutual decision-making
responsibility over the objection of the other party or the child’s representative,
unless the court finds that the parties can make shared decisions about their
children without physical confrontation and that places the abused party or child
in danger. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-124 (1.5)(b)(v) (West 1997). In the
state of Washington, a parent’s residential time with child will be limited if there
exists a history of acts of domestic violence or assault/sexual assault “which causes
grievous bodily harm or fear of such harm.” WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
26.09.191(2)(a)(ii)-(iii) (West 1997). In Wisconsin, a rebuttable presumption
exists that the parents will not be able to cooperate in future decision-making
when domestic violence is present. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.24(2)(b)-(c) (West
1993). Pennsylvania also gives great weight to the perpetration of domestic
violence or sexual assault by requiring successful completion of a batterer’s
treatment program if the abuser is convicted of certain crimes. See 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5303 (West 1991).
53. Elrod & Spector, supra note 32, at 613-14.
54. Id.
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B. Presumption Applicable Only to Joint Custody
Some presumption statutes apply only to decisions regarding
joint custody. In a few of these states, the presumption against joint
custody to the abuser is coupled with a presumption favoring joint
55
custody in the absence of abuse. The District of Columbia Code
provides that there is a rebuttable presumption that joint custody is
not in the best interest of the child if the court finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that an intra-family offense has
56
occurred. It also provides for a rebuttable presumption favoring
joint custody unless the court finds by a preponderance of the
57
evidence that an intra-family offense has occurred.
Similarly,
section 32-717B of the Idaho Code states that there is a
presumption that joint custody is not in the best interests of a
minor child if the court finds that one of the parents is a habitual
58
perpetrator of domestic violence. It also contains a presumption
that joint custody is in the best interest of the child absent a
59
preponderance of the evidence to the contrary.
This type of
provision is not very beneficial for victims of domestic violence,
since even if the presumption against joint custody is rebutted
through evidence of abuse, the victimized parent must still prove to
the court that it is in the best interests of the child to be placed with
him or her rather than with the abusive parent.
A particularly problematic statute is found in Minnesota, which
contains a similar provision, but applicable only to joint legal
60
custody. Minnesota Statute section 518.17 includes a rebuttable
presumption that joint legal custody is not in the best interests of
61
the child if domestic abuse has occurred between the parents.
However, the same code section states that there is also a rebuttable
presumption that joint legal custody, if requested by either or both
62
parties, is in the best interests of the child. Clearly there will be
many cases in which these two policies conflict, especially when the
abusive parent can trigger the presumption favoring joint legal
55. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-119(a)(5), 16-914(a)(2) (1997); IDAHO
CODE § 32-717 B (Michie 1996).
56. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-119(a)(5), 16-914(a)(2) (1997).
57. Id.
58. See IDAHO CODE § 32-717 B (5) (Michie 1996).
59. See id. § 32-717 B (4).
60. See MINN. STAT. § 518.17, subd. 2(d) (2000).
61. Id. The statute does not state what evidence rebuts the presumption. Id.
62. Id. New Hampshire law provides a similar provision. See N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 458:17(II)(e)(1992) (amended by 2001 N.H. Laws 102).
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custody merely by requesting it. Case law demonstrating how
courts have resolved this dilemma will be discussed below. On the
other hand, the Minnesota statute does state that if the court
awards joint custody, it must make detailed findings of fact on each
63
of the best interest standards.
C. Presumption Applicable to Sole or Joint Custody
Most of the presumption states have no contrary presumption
favoring joint custody in the absence of domestic violence or when
requested by a parent. Statutes stating that the presumption
applies to sole or joint custody to a perpetrator are in effect in
Alabama, Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
64
Oregon, Texas, and South Dakota.
D. What Triggers the Presumption?
Statutes vary in terms in how they define domestic violence
and what standard of proof is required in order to trigger the
presumption against awarding custody to an abuser. Several states
define domestic violence by cross-referencing other statutes, such
65
as a state’s restraining order statute. It is important to take note
whether these statutes include threats of physical harm, or only
actual physical harm. Also note that the statutes tend to leave out
other types of batterer behavior which are intended to dominate
and control victims, such as emotional abuse, sexual abuse,
financial abuse, and property abuse, all of which may be intended
66
to dominate and control the victim.
In terms of standards of proof, in some states, the statute
merely provides that there must be a “finding of domestic
67
68
violence,” or “credible evidence of domestic violence.” A few
statutes specify that the standard will be the lowest possible, the
63. MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (2000).
64. For citations to the rebuttable presumption statutes, see supra note 51.
65. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044 (West Supp. 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13
§ 705A (1999); MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (2000); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.24 (West
1993).
66. Amy Pincolini, A Tool for Safety: Child Custody Presumptions, 5 SYNERGY 6, 7
(2000) (published by Nat. Council of Juv. & Fam. Ct. Judges, Reno, NV).
67. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:364 (West 2000); MINN. STAT. § 518.17
(2000).
68. See, e.g., N. D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2 (1)(j) (West Supp. 2001).
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69

preponderance of the evidence.
Other states require the
70
standard of “clear and convincing evidence” of domestic violence.
Wisconsin requires evidence of a crime of inter-spousal battery or
abuse, as defined in the statute providing for civil protective
71
orders. However, actual conviction is not required in this state
before the presumption is triggered.
Some states require that the domestic violence have occurred
more than once. For example, Idaho requires that the abuser be a
72
“habitual perpetrator” before the presumption is triggered. Iowa
73
requires “a history of domestic abuse,” and Oklahoma requires
74
“ongoing domestic abuse.” In several states, there must be either
a pattern or history of abuse, or at least one serious incident before
the presumption is triggered.
These include Louisiana,
75
Massachusetts, and North Dakota.
The highest standards of proof are found in states requiring
76
that the abuser first be convicted of a domestic violence crime. As
stated above, Nevada’s presumption can be triggered by clear and
convincing evidence of domestic violence; alternatively, it can be
triggered by a conviction of sexual assault or first-degree murder of
77
the other parent.
Setting the standard for triggering the presumption high will
69. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044 (West Supp. 2001); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16911, 16-914 (1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. chs. 208, § 31A, 209, § 38, 209C § 10
(West Supp. 2001).
70. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.480(5) (1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 112.2
(West 2001); 2001 Okla. Sess. Laws 141 (amending OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 21.1
(2000)).
71. WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 767.24, 813.12 (West 1993).
72. IDAHO CODE § 32-717B(5) (Michie 2000).
73. IOWA CODE ANN. § 598-41 (West Supp. 2001).
74. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 112.2 (West 2001); 2001 Okla. Sess. Laws 141.
75. Louisiana requires more than one incident or a finding that one incident
of family violence resulted in serious bodily injury. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:364(A)
(West 2000). Massachusetts requires either a pattern or serious incident of abuse.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. chs. 208, § 31A, 209, § 38, 209C § 10 (West Supp. 2001).
North Dakota requires either one incident resulting in serious bodily injury or
involving the use of a dangerous weapon, or a pattern of domestic violence within
a reasonable time proximate to the proceeding. N. D. CENT. CODE § 14-0906.2(i)(j) (1999).
76. Florida requires a conviction for a third degree felony or higher involving
domestic violence. 2001 Fla. Laws ch. 2001-2 (amending FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13
(West 1997)). South Dakota requires a conviction of domestic abuse or assault, or
homicide of the other parent. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 25-4-45.5, 25-4-45.6 (Michie
1999).
77. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 125.480, 125C.210, 125C.220, 125C.230 (Michie
Supp. 1999).
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of course exclude many domestic violence cases, in which there has
been only one incident of abuse, and no conviction. In many
relationships, one incident of abuse can be sufficient to dominate
and control the victim throughout the relationship. This can occur
when the batterer uses the incident to warn and remind the victim
78
of what can happen. Of course, children who are aware of the
abuse by one parent toward the other can also be traumatized by
79
one incident.
However, in some cases the high standards enumerated here
were narrowly drafted to account for the possibility that some
abused parents might use violence in self-defense or to protect
children, in which case the presumption was not designed to
80
apply. As will be seen in the discussion in Part IV, in states with
lower standards for triggering the presumption, such actions by the
abused parent may be seen as nullifying the presumption. In
drafting the language of such statutes, legislators and advocates
must always engage in balancing tests, weighing the benefits of a
lower standard for triggering the presumption against the danger
to victims who fight back.
E. Cases In Which Both Parents Have Engaged in Domestic Violence
Some of the presumption statutes address situations in which
both parents appear to have engaged in abuse. In at least one
81
state, Louisiana, the statute contains a “primary aggressor”
provision. This directs the court to determine which of the parents
is the main or dominant aggressor, and to ascertain whether one of
the parents was actually acting to defend herself or himself or
82
another person, such as the child. The North Dakota Supreme
Court has developed such a concept through its decisions
83
interpreting the presumption. In other states, the statute provides
78. DONALD G. DUTTON AND SUSAN K. GOLANT, THE BATTERER: A
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILE 13, 23, 24 (1995).
79. Janis Wolak & David Finkelhor, Children Exposed to Partner Violence in
PARTNER VIOLENCE: A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF TWENTY YEARS OF RESEARCH 90
(Janis L. Jasinski & Linda M. Williams eds., 1998).
80. The Family Violence Project, supra note 18, at 206.
81. This term was changed to “dominant aggressor” in CAL. PENAL CODE §
836, effective January 2001. The legislative history indicates that this change was
made in order to clarify that the focus should be on which party dominates the
other, rather than on who “started the fight.”
82. See, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:362(3) (West 2000).
83. See, e.g., Krank v. Krank, 529 N.W.2d 844, 848 (N.D. 1995).
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that if both parents are found to have committed domestic
84
violence, the presumption against the abuser does not apply.
Given the likelihood that both parents will be found to be
abusers in states with low standards for triggering the presumption,
it would probably be advisable to amend these statutes to provide
for a primary or dominant aggressor analysis. This is similar to the
analysis which law enforcement uses in some states when
85
determining which party to arrest.
F. Rebutting the Presumption
The statutes also vary in terms of what is necessary in order to
rebut the presumption. Most states do not specify what is required
for rebuttal, which does not give courts any guidance. A few states
specify the evidentiary standard required, but do not list actual
factors for consideration, which also leaves the court having to
86
create its own standards from case to case.
Other states list specific factors that the court must consider in
87
finding that the presumption has been rebutted. For example,
California states that the court must consider 1) whether the
perpetrator has shown that it is in the best interest of the child to
be in the custody of that parent; 2) successful completion of a
batterer’s program; 3) successful completion of a program for
alcohol or drug abuse if found appropriate by the court; 4)
compliance with court orders and with probation and parole
conditions, if applicable; and 5) whether there has been any
88
89
further violence. The Arizona and Delaware factors are virtually
90
identical to this. Louisiana requires the successful completion of
a treatment program for batterers, refraining from abuse of alcohol
84. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403(N) (2000) (amended by 2001 Ariz.
Sess. Laws 14); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044(c) (West Supp. 2001).
85. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 836 (West Supp. 2001). However, see the
discussion in Part IV regarding the controversy surrounding whether to include
such a provision.
86. For example, in Massachusetts the court must find by preponderance of
evidence that custody to abuser is in best interests of child. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
chs. 208 § 31A, 209 § 38, 209C § 10 (1998). In North Dakota, the presumption
may be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence that the best interests of
the child require that parent’s participation as custodial parent. N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-09-06.2(1)(j)(1999).
87. These states include: Arizona, California, Delaware, and Louisiana.
88. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044(b) (West Supp. 2001).
89. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-403 (2000) (amended by 2001 Ariz. Sess. Laws 14).
90. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 705A (1999).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol28/iss2/2

18

04_FORMAT.LEMON.10.12.01.DOC

2001

11/1/2001 5:58 PM

Lemon: Statutes Creating Rebuttable Presumptions against Custody to Batt
REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTIONS AGAINST CUSTODY

619

or illegal drugs, and demonstrating that the absence or incapacity
of the abused parent or other circumstances are such that custody
91
granted to the perpetrator is in the best interests of the child. Its
statute also directs the court to give sole custody to the parent who
92
is least likely to continue perpetration of family violence.
As noted previously, Wisconsin has a presumption only against
93
joint legal custody in domestic violence cases. In order to rebut
this, there must be clear and convincing evidence that the
perpetrator will not interfere with the abused party’s ability to
94
cooperate in future decision-making.
G. If the Presumption is Found Inapplicable or Rebutted
If the presumption is found inapplicable or rebutted, then the
parties may still have the benefit of statutes requiring that domestic
95
violence be considered in custody decisions.
Legislatures are
strongly encouraged to enact such statutes, so that the issue of
domestic violence does not disappear from the custody decision.
In the absence of such statutes, the court applies the general best
interest of the child standard and the parties are on a level playing
field. This may be very problematic for the battered parent, who
then still has to convince the court that the child has been
adversely affected by the abuse, or that there is ongoing danger to
the victim parent or child.
H. Case Study: Development of the Presumption in California
While California was not the first state to adopt a rebuttable
presumption statute, the history of its legislation is a useful
example of a “step by step” approach. Like many other states,
California attempted several different versions of its custody
statutes before passing a statute establishing a presumption against
custody to batterers.
California was the fifteenth state to adopt such a presumption
96
This legislation, A.B.
statute, which took effect January 2000.

91. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:364(A) (West 2000).
92. Id. § 9:364(B).
93. See supra note 52.
94. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.24 (West 1993).
95. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011 (West Supp. 2001).
96. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044 (West 2000) (added by Stats. 1999, c. 445 (A.B.
840), §1).
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97

840, was carried by Speaker Pro Tem Sheila Kuehl, a long-time
98
advocate for victims of domestic violence. The California Alliance
99
Against Domestic Violence (C.A.A.D.V.) sponsored the bill.
Supporters included medical groups, law enforcement,
prosecutors, Boards of Supervisors, many women’s groups, the
California State PTA, and numerous domestic violence
100
organizations.
Opposition included the California Judges
Association, the Judicial Council, the Family Law Section of the
State Bar, and the Coalition of Parent Support, a father’s rights
101
102
group.
This legislation was based on the Model Code.
Kuehl
had been a member of the national task force which wrote that
Code.
A.B. 840 was preceded by two bills, both of which were carried
by Assemblywoman Kuehl. A.B. 800, introduced in 1996, died in
the Senate Judiciary Committee, and A.B. 200, introduced in 1997,
was amended in that same committee to remove the rebuttable
presumption language. A.B. 200, amending Family Code sections
103
3011 and 3020, was effective January 1998.
Among other
provisions, these sections now mandate that judges prioritize the
child’s health, safety, and welfare over the policy favoring frequent
104
and continuing contact with each parent after separation.
They
also require judges to make written findings of fact or statements
on the record as to why they are awarding custody to an alleged
perpetrator of domestic violence or child abuse, or to an alleged
105
substance abuser.
97. A.B. 840/ Assembly Bill 840, 1999 Legs. (Cal. 1999).
98. Syrus Devers, AB 840 Assembly Bill, Bill Analysis 3, at
http:www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/9900/bill/asm/ab_08010850/ab_840_cfa_19990422
_080416_asm_comm.html (April 20, 1999). See also, http://democrats.sen.ca.gov/
senator/kuehl (describing Senator Kuehl’s achievements). Assemblywoman
Sheila Kuehl is serving her first term in the California Senate after serving six years
in the State Assembly. Id. She was formerly the Speaker Pro Tempore of the
Assembly (from 1997-98). Id. Kuehl is also a former Professor of Law at Loyola,
U.C.L.A. and U.S.C. Schools of Law and co-founder of the California Women’s
Law Center. Id.
99. Devers, supra note 98, at 3.
100. Id. at 8-9.
101. See id. at 9.
102. See id. at 3. See also, supra note 27 and accompanying text (describing the
ABA’s Model Code).
103. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011 (amended by stats. 1997, c.899 (A.B. 200), §2);
CAL. FAM. CODE § 3020 (amended by Stats. 1997, c. 849 (A.B. 200), § 3).
104. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3020(c) (West Supp. 2001).
105. Id. See also, Marlene Rapkin, The Impact of Domestic Violence on Child Custody
Decisions, 19 J. JUV. L. 404 (1998) (describing the legislative history of A.B. 200 and
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A.B. 840 created a new code section, Family Code section
106
Subdivision (a) describes how a victim of domestic
3044.
107
violence raises the presumption.
There are several limitations.
108
First, the incident must have occurred within the last five years.
Second, the presumption is triggered only by incidents in which
the victim was the other person seeking custody of the child, the
109
child, or the child’s siblings.
Third, the court must make a
finding that domestic violence occurred, so that allegations alone
110
do not trigger the presumption.
If the court makes such a
finding, the burden of proof then shifts to the perpetrator to prove
why it is in the best interests of the child to be in his or her
111
All types of custody are specifically included, whether
custody.
112
legal or physical, sole or joint.
However, the new code section
113
does not address visitation.
Subdivision (b) of Family Code section 3044 describes how the
perpetrator can rebut the presumption, clarifying that the standard
of proof is a preponderance of the evidence, and listing several
factors that the court is directed to consider in making this
114
determination. According to subdivision (c) the presumption
does not apply if both parents are found to have perpetrated
115
domestic violence. This subdivision had originally provided for a
“primary aggressor” analysis, cross-referencing the California Penal

arguing that it did not go far enough, that is that California needed to enact a
presumption against custody to batterers).
106. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044 (West Supp. 2001). A particularly useful
document in terms of legislative history of this code section was written by Syrus
Devers, legislative counsel for the California Assembly Judiciary Committee, when
the bill was heard in that committee April 22, 1999. See Devers, supra note 98.
107. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044(a) (West Supp. 2001)(stating “[u]pon a finding
by the court that a party seeking custody of a child has perpetrated domestic
violence against the other party seeking custody of the child or against the child or
the child’s sibling within the previous five years, there is a rebuttable presumption
that an award of sole or joint physical or legal custody of a child to the person who
has perpetrated the domestic violence is detrimental the best interest of the
child.”).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044(b)(1) (West Supp. 2001).
112. Id. § 3044(a).
113. Id.
114. Id. § 3044(b)(1)-(6).
115. Id. § 3044(e) (stating that “[i]n most cases in which both parents are
perpetrators of domestic violence, this presumption shall not be applicable.”).
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116

Code’s definition of that term, but was amended in the Senate
Judiciary Committee to delete that provision. Subdivision (d)
defines domestic violence, using the same standard as is used in
Family Code section 6320 for obtaining a Domestic Violence
117
Restraining Order.
I.

Effects of Presumption Statutes
1. Overview

How are these statutes working? Are they accomplishing the
objectives of the legislators who authored them and the groups who
supported them? Is implementation uniform or uneven? Do
presumptions against custody to batterers mean that family courts
now are giving domestic violence the weight it deserves? Is there a
backlash in some jurisdictions, and if so, what does it look like? In
attempting to answer these questions, this section will look at
118
appellate cases, articles by commentators, surveys, and anecdotal
comments from advocates, attorneys, judges, and academics in the
presumption jurisdictions.
Appellate cases from the jurisdictions with such a presumption
119
indicate that in general it appears to be useful.
However, there
116. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 863 (e)(3) (West 2001) (defining the term
“primary aggressor”). Section 836 also states the factors that a police officer
should consider in identifying the primary aggressor, including “the intent of the
law to protect victims of domestic violence from continuing abuse” and “the
history of domestic violence between the persons involved.” Id.
117. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044(d) (West Supp. 2001) (stating that a person has
“perpetrated domestic violence” for the purposes of section 3044 “when he or she
is found by the court to have intentionally or recklessly caused or attempted to
cause bodily injury, or sexual assault or to have placed a person in reasonable
apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to that person . . . for which a
court may issue an ex parte order pursuant to section 1320.”).
118. See generally Jack M. Dagleish, Annotation, Construction and Effect of Statutes
Mandating Consideration of, or Creating Presumptions Regarding, Domestic Violence in
Awarding Custody of Children, 51 A.L.R.5th 241 (1997) (Supp. Sept. 2000).
119. Cases decided in and anecdotal reports from the states that give domestic
violence great weight but do not have an actual rebuttable presumption against
awarding custody to a perpetrator will not be included here, as they are beyond
the scope of this article. See, e.g., Bartholf v. Bartholf, 619 N.W.2d 308 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2000). Anna Farber Conrad, Criminal Justice Advocacy Director of the
Colorado Coalition Against Domestic Violence, stated that Colorado judges often
do not see any correlation between partner abuse and custody issues, and may not
allow domestic violence experts to testify at custody trials. E-mail from Anna
Farber Conrad, Criminal Justice Advocacy Director of the Colorado Coalition
Against Domestic Violence to author, Professor of Law, University of California at
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are some problems with implementation found in the appellate
cases. These include a lack of guidance for judges as to what
factors should be considered in determining whether the
presumption has been raised or overcome.
The jurisdictions will be discussed in roughly the order in
which they adopted the rebuttable presumption, with the most
experienced jurisdictions first, followed by those which have
moderate experience with this statute, and finishing with
jurisdictions where the presumption is very new. Looking at the
jurisdictions in rough chronological order is useful in determining
whether the initial problems presented by the enactment of such
statutes, if any, are eventually resolved over time.
2. Jurisdictions With Many Years Experience Applying the
Presumption
a. North Dakota
North Dakota has by far the most reported appellate decisions
applying the rebuttable presumption, having enacted its first such
120
Notably, the statute has been amended several
statute in 1991.
121
While the North
times in response to some of these decisions.
Dakota Supreme Court has had to restate the basic rules many
times (for example, that the trial courts must make findings as to
whether domestic violence occurred), it appears that the statute is
effective in ensuring that domestic violence is taken seriously in
custody decisions.
The first North Dakota case decided under the new
122
presumption was Schestler v. Schestler.
In this case, the wife’s
evidence of domestic violence by the husband was found to have
123
However, the court then held that
triggered the presumption.
Berkeley (June 18, 2001). See also Caven v. Caven, 966 P.2d 1247 (Wash. 1998)
(relying on the plain language of the statute to conclude that the father’s history
of domestic violence restricted the trial court’s discretion in determining whether
the parents should mutually make decisions about the children).
120. North Dakota, like several other less populous states, has no intermediate
appellate court, so whenever a trial court decision is appealed, it is heard by the
state supreme court.
121. See Kathleen B. Garner, Infants, Parent and Child: Applying the Rebuttable
Presumption Against Awarding Custody to Perpetrators of Domestic Violence, Heck v.
Reed, 529 N.W.2d 155 (N.D. 1995), 72 N.D. L. REV. 155 (1996).
122. 486 N.W.2d 509 (N.D. 1992).
123. Id. at 511-12.
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124

the husband had rebutted the presumption.
This holding was
upheld by the Supreme Court, which stated that domestic violence
125
Thus the
had no priority over the other best interest factors.
presumption could be rebutted by the customary weighing of those
factors. A strong dissent by one of the justices argued that this
126
interpretation of the statute rendered the new law meaningless.
This dissent was later quoted with approval in several North Dakota
127
Supreme Court cases.
As a result of this decision, the statute was amended the
following year, 1993, to clarify that the presumption could be
rebutted only by showing clear and convincing evidence that the
best interests of the child require the perpetrator to be the
128
custodian. This raised the evidentiary standard from the previous
129
one, which had required only “credible evidence” for rebuttal.
However, at no time has the statute given courts guidance in terms
of what is necessary to rebut the presumption. The courts have had
to determine this on a case by case basis.
The amended statute produced a great number of appellate
decisions in the following few years. In 1995, the North Dakota
Supreme Court decided five cases on this topic, three of which
130
dealt with rebuttal issues
and two with what triggers the
131
presumption.
132
In Heck v. Reed, the first case decided in 1995, the court
stated that the rebuttal of the presumption requires compelling or
exceptional circumstances demonstrating that the best interests of
133
the child require custody to be placed in perpetrator. Thus, the
trial court may not consider the absence of abuse directed at the
children as a factor rebutting the presumption. The court
discussed the negative effect of domestic violence on children even
124. Id. at 512.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 515 (Levine, J., dissenting). For a discussion of this case see Garner,
supra note 121, at 158-61.
127. These include Helbling v. Helbling, 532 N.W.2d 650 (N.D. 1995), Krank
v. Krank, 529 N.W.2d 844 (N.D. 1995), and Ryan v. Fleming, 533 N.W.2d 920
(N.D. 1995).
128. Garner, supra note 121, at 160-61.
129. Id. at 161.
130. Heck v. Reed, 529 N.W.2d 155 (N.D. 1995); Helbling, 532 N.W.2d at 650;
Bruner v. Hager, 534 N.W.2d 825 (N.D. 1995).
131. Krank, 529 N.W.2d at 844; Ryan, 533 N.W.2d at 920.
132. 529 N.W.2d at 155.
133. Id. at 162.
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134

if they are not directly abused.
Furthermore, there was no
evidence that the father had gone to counseling or was no longer
135
violent.
136
Next came Krank v. Krank, in which the court addressed the
issue of what level of violence is necessary to raise the presumption,
137
with the high court holding that a single act could do this.
The
court reversed an award of joint legal custody and sole physical
138
custody to the batterer father. It remanded the case for findings
139
on whether the alleged domestic violence had occurred.
This
analysis was necessary in order to respond to the allegations of
140
The court stated that if one parent were the
mutual violence.
more significant abuser, the presumption should apply only to that
parent, but if both parties were equally violent, the court should
141
apply the general best interest factors.
142
In Helbling v. Helbling, the court found that the presumption
143
had been raised and not rebutted. The appellate court reversed
the award of custody to the batterer father and remanded the
144
Since both parties had alleged violence by each other, the
case.
high court directed the trial court to determine which one was the
145
146
most significant abuser. Only in Ryan v. Flemming, did the court
find that the presumption had not arisen at all, even though the
father admitted having broken a flower pot and tearing the phone
147
out of the wall.
The court stated that because the incident
resulted in no injury to the mother, and was isolated and remote in
148
149
time, it did not trigger the presumption. In Bruner v. Hager, the
134. Id. at 164.
135. Id. at 165.
136. Krank, 529 N.W.2d at 844.
137. Id. at 850.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. 532 N.W.2d 650 (N.D. 1995).
143. Id. at 653.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. 533 N.W.2d 920 (N.D. 1995).
147. Id. at 924. These acts would suffice to trigger the presumption in some
states. See for example, the California Family Code section 3044, which includes
destruction of personal property in its definition of domestic violence through a
cross-reference to sections 6203 and 6320. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 3044(d), 6203,
6320 (West Supp. 2001).
148. Ryan, 533 N.W.2d at 924.
149. 534 N.W.2d 825 (N.D. 1995).
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trial court’s award of custody to the batterer father was reversed,
with the court stating that now domestic violence is the paramount
150
factor in a custody decision where such violence has occurred.
151
Similar to the holding in Heck v. Reed, the North Dakota Supreme
Court stated that the father’s cessation of substance abuse in Bruner
and fact that he had not physically abused the children did not
152
rebut the presumption.
The following year the North Dakota Supreme Court decided
five more cases interpreting this statute. In the first, Owan v.
153
Owan, there were allegations of mutual violence; the high court
directed the trial court not to rely on the father’s expert witness to
assess his trial testimony, but instead to make its own findings as to
whether domestic violence had been perpetrated or not and by
154
155
whom. In Engh v. Jensen, the high court again reversed the trial
156
court, which had also awarded custody to the batterer father.
The high court explained that the father’s mere separation from
157
In
the mother was insufficient to rebut the presumption.
158
Anderson v. Hensrud, the court held that the presumption is not
confined to situations in which a parent or child is the direct victim
of the domestic violence, since the statute defines domestic
159
violence to include any family or household member. In Kraft v.
160
Kraft, the appellate court held that domestic violence by the
mother’s fiance, who lived with the mother and her children, could
potentially rebut the presumption against custody to the father,
161
who had been violent toward the mother in the past. In Ternes v.
162
Ternes, one parent’s attempt to show that the other parent was
violent was not raised at the trial court level, thus was not
163
something the high court could address.
150. Id. at 828-29.
151. 529 N.W.2d 155 (N.D. 1995).
152. Bruner, 534 N.W.2d at 828.
153. 541 N.W.2d 719 (N.D. 1996).
154. Id. at 722-23.
155. 547 N.W.2d 922 (N.D. 1996).
156. Id. at 923.
157. Id. at 926.
158. 548 N.W.2d 410 (N.D. 1996).
159. Id. at 413.
160. 554 N.W.2d 657 (N.D. 1996).
161. Id. at 661.
162. 555 N.W.2d 355 (N.D. 1996).
163. Id. at 358-59. While this may have been a strategy decision on the part of
the victim parent’s attorney, it is more likely to have been an oversight, in which
case it is an example of the importance of training family law attorneys about any
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The North Dakota statute was most recently amended effective
164
The amendment
April 3, 1997 as an emergency measure.
provided that the presumption could be triggered if “there exists
one incident of domestic violence which resulted in serious bodily
injury or involved the use of a dangerous weapon or there exists a
pattern of domestic violence within a reasonable time proximate to
165
the proceeding.”
The North Dakota Supreme Court also produced five cases
166
about the rebuttable presumption in 1997. Kluck v. Kluck, the
167
first case that year, involved allegations of mutual abuse.
The
high court upheld the trial court’s assessment that one parent’s
168
In
violent conduct was significantly greater than the other’s.
169
Zuger v. Zuger, the high court reversed a joint custody award
where the presumption had been raised and had not been
170
The high court stated that the trial court’s
sufficiently rebutted.
finding that the victim parent was over-protective, that the violence
would not occur again, and that the violence was not directed at
171
the children was insufficient to rebut the presumption.
172
In Dinius v. Dinius,
the high court applied the new
amendment and held that the acts of domestic violence were too
173
In
remote in time and too minor to trigger the presumption.
174
Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, the high court again reversed the trial
court and remanded the case because the trial court had failed to
175
determine which parent had been the more significant abuser.
176
In Huesers v. Huesers, the high court also reversed the trial court,
177
which had refused to consider the new amendment. It held that
the trial court should use the new amendment as a guide to
determine whether pre-amendment conduct was sufficient to

statutes involving domestic violence.
164. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(1)(j) (1979) (amended 1997).
165. Id.
166. 561 N.W.2d 263 (N.D. 1997).
167. Id. at 267.
168. Id. at 268.
169. 563 N.W.2d 804 (N.D. 1997).
170. Id. at 810.
171. Id.
172. 564 N.W.2d 300 (N.D. 1997).
173. Id. at 303.
174. 569 N.W.2d 277 (N.D. 1997).
175. Id. at 279.
176. 574 N.W.2d 880 (N.D. 1997).
177. Id. at 882.
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178

invoke the presumption.
In 1998, two cases on this topic were published. In Kasprowicz
179
v. Kasprowicz, the high court reversed the trial court, giving two
180
reasons.
First, the high court reversed and remanded because
the trial court failed to make a factual finding in support of their
181
decision to grant rotating custody.
In addition, the court also
reversed and remanded the trial court to apply the amended
182
183
In Carver v. Miller, the high
presumption statute if applicable.
court upheld the trial court’s finding that the presumption against
the batterer father had been rebutted by the mother’s drug use and
184
exposure of the child to a drug-related atmosphere.
In 1999, the Supreme Court returned to its earlier volume of
cases, issuing five rebuttable presumption decisions. In three of
these, the presumption was found inapplicable because the
standard for triggering it established in the 1997 statutory
185
186
amendment was not met.
In the first, Reeves v. Chepulis, the
187
high court upheld the trial court’s award of custody to the father.
While there was one episode of domestic violence by the father, it
188
did not rise to the level required to trigger the presumption. In
189
Green v. Green, the court reiterated that clear and convincing
190
evidence was required to rebut the presumption.
In Schumacher
191
192
v. Schumacher, there were allegations of mutual abuse.
The
court held that even though the wife had slapped the husband
twice, his violence against her was worse, thus triggering the
193
194
presumption against him. In Holtz v. Holtz, the court held that
178. Id. at 882-83.
179. 575 N.W.2d 921 (N.D. 1998).
180. Id. at 924.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. 585 N.W.2d 139 (N.D. 1998).
184. Id. at 143-44. These rebuttal factors are not typical of those found in
statutes which specify such factors. Given the lack of rebuttal factors in the North
Dakota statute, trial courts must make this determination on a case by case basis.
185. Reeves v. Chepulis, 591 N.W.2d 791 (N.D. 1999); Green v. Green, 593
N.W.2d 398 (N.D. 1999); Brown v. Brown, 600 N.W.2d 869 (N.D. 1999).
186. 591 N.W.2d at 791.
187. Id. at 797.
188. Id. at 795.
189. 593 N.W.2d at 398.
190. Id. at 400.
191. 598 N.W.2d 131 (N.D. 1999).
192. Id. at 134-35.
193. Id. at 136.
194. 595 N.W.2d 1 (N.D. 1999).
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the presumption also applied to dating relationships, cohabitants,
195
196
In Brown v. Brown, the high court
and former cohabitants.
upheld the trial court’s finding that the presumption had not been
197
triggered where there were allegations of mutual abuse. Neither
party was seriously injured and neither party’s behavior established
198
a pattern sufficient to trigger the rebuttable presumption.
The
high court further stated that “[d]omestic violence under [the]
199
statute does not include name-calling.”
In 2000, the court decided only two cases in which the
presumption against custody to perpetrators was at issue. In Cox v.
200
Cox, the court held that the wife’s evidence of domestic violence
by the husband was insufficient to trigger the presumption, in spite
of evidence that he had hit her car once and bruised her in several
201
places another time. The court stated that it did not find most of
202
203
her allegations credible.
In Tulintseff v. Jacobsen, the court
interpreted the phrase “reasonable time proximate to the
proceeding,” a prerequisite to raising the presumption under
current statute, if there is no evidence of use of a dangerous
204
weapon or serious bodily injury.
The trial court held that abuse
which had occurred three or more years before the wife filed a
request to modify joint custody to sole custody was too remote to
205
206
raise the presumption. This was upheld by the Supreme Court.
195. Id. at 9.
196. 600 N.W.2d 869 (N.D. 1999).
197. Id. at 873.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 874. This last comment is significant because the court is thereby
excluding emotional abuse, the most frequent form of domestic violence, and
according to victims, the most damaging, as unlike physical violence, it tends to be
continuous, chipping away at the victim’s self esteem until she feels powerless. See
Pincolini, supra note 56, at 7; DUTTON & GOLANT, supra note 78, at 23, 140. Of
course, including emotional abuse in the definition of domestic violence would
also open the door to a backlash from perpetrators, who often say that they feel
emotionally abused by their victims.
200. 613 N.W.2d 516 (N.D. 2000).
201. Id. at 521.
202. Id.
203. 615 N.W.2d 129 (N.D. 2000).
204. North Dakota’s presumption statute creates a rebuttable presumption
against awarding custody to the perpetrator of domestic violence under three
circumstances: (1) if “there exists one incident of domestic violence which
resulted in serious bodily injury,” (2) if “there exists one incident of domestic
violence which involved the use of a dangerous weapon,” or (3) if “there exists a
pattern of domestic violence within a reasonable time proximate to the
preceeding.” N. D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(1)(j) (1999).
205. Tulintseff, 615 N.W.2d at 134. The trial court also stated that the
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So far, the North Dakota Supreme Court has decided only one
207
In that case, the court
case on point in 2001, Hurt v. Hurt.
upheld the custody award to the wife, based partly on the history of
208
domestic violence.
Notably, the trial court rejected the
209
recommendation of the guardian ad litem. With no explanation,
the trial court found that the presumption was not triggered even
though the wife had obtained orders of protection and had taken
the children with her to a domestic violence shelter twice, shortly
210
before filing for divorce. The appellate court did not reverse this
211
finding.
Since the presumption was not raised, the domestic
violence by the husband was considered as part of the best interest
analysis, along with an overall assessment of each party’s parenting
212
abilities.
Overall it is clear that the presumption statute has been taken
seriously in North Dakota. It is also clear that frequent appellate
review is key to actually changing trial court practices.
b. Louisiana
Louisiana adopted the rebuttable presumption in 1992, with
very mixed results. In the first case to interpret the statute, Simmons
213
v. Simmons, the appellate court held that a single past act of
violence is not a “history of perpetrating family violence,” which
would have triggered the statutory presumption against the award
214
of custody to a perpetrator.
The court reasoned that this
determination must be based on a review of the total circumstances
215
of the family and involves the weighing of evidence. In this case,
husband’s breaking a table, two chairs, a stairway railing, and a mirror did not
constitute domestic violence. Id. at 133 n.2. This was because, according to the
trial court, there was no evidence that these actions caused the wife to feel afraid
that the husband would harm her. Id.
206. Id. at 134-35. This finding, upheld by the appellate court, shows the
danger of defining domestic violence too narrowly in statutes creating
presumptions against custody to batterers.
207. 621 N.W.2d 326 (N.D. 2001).
208. Id. at 330.
209. Id. at 331.
210. Id. at 330. “The evidence of domestic violence presented to the trial
court did not trigger the rebuttable presumption under N.D.C.C. § 14-0906.2(1)(j).” Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 328-31.
213. 649 So. 2d 799 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
214. Id. at 801.
215. Id. at 802.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol28/iss2/2

30

04_FORMAT.LEMON.10.12.01.DOC

2001

11/1/2001 5:58 PM

Lemon: Statutes Creating Rebuttable Presumptions against Custody to Batt
REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTIONS AGAINST CUSTODY

631

the appellate court agreed that the trial court did not err in
216
The wife claimed that she
refusing to apply the presumption.
had needed both police and medical assistance as a result of the
217
husband’s violence but could document only one incident.
The
husband stated that the abuse had never taken place in front of the
218
children and was provoked by the wife’s adulterous affair.
The
husband was upheld as the primary domiciliary parent, principally
219
because he was more stable geographically.
220
In Michelli v. Michelli, decided later that same year, another
circuit of the appellate court held that the family violence does not
have to have been frequent or continuous before the presumption
221
In that case, the trial court had held that the
is triggered.
presumption was not triggered in spite of evidence of numerous
incidents of physical abuse by the husband, some of which were
222
documented and witnessed by third parties.
The trial court
referred to the abuse as mutual “family fights,” discounting
223
evidence that the wife was defending herself. However, this time
the appellate court disagreed, holding that it was reversible error
not to allow the wife to submit a proffer of evidence concerning the
224
criminal charges against the husband, and that the trial court
should have found that the presumption was triggered by the
225
evidence of the many incidents of abuse.
Subdivision (A) of the statute was amended in 1995 to clarify
that a history of perpetrating family violence means either one
incident resulting in serious bodily injury or more than one
226
This was presumably a response to the Simmons
incident.
holding.
Two years later, the Louisiana Court of Appeal decided
227
Morrison v. Morrison.
The court upheld the award of provisional
228
custody to the mother, based on the presumption.
The court
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 800.
Id. at 802-03.
655 So.2d 1342 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
Id. at 1349.
Id. at 1347-48.
Id. at 1348.
Id. at 1350.
Id. at 1349.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:364(a) (West 2000).
699 So.2d 1124 (La. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 1127.
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found that both parents had a history of perpetrating family
229
violence. However, the court additionally found that the mother
230
was less likely to continue to do so than was the father. This is a
231
statutory consideration.
However, the court remanded the case
so that the trial court could order the mother to participate in and
complete a treatment program, due to her history of violence
232
toward the father, as required by statute.
The final decision was
233
contingent on the mother’s completing this program.
The following year, the Louisiana appellate court decided
234
Raney v. Wren.
In that case, the trial court ordered that the
parents have joint custody, with the father as the domiciliary
235
parent. In her motion to modify the ruling, filed a year later, the
wife alleged that she signed the original consent judgment only
236
because of the husband’s abusive behavior and threats. However,
237
her motion was denied by the trial court.
The trial court found
that the earlier abuse was not relevant and that her allegations were
not credible, thus the presumption against custody to batterers was
238
inapplicable. The trial court stated that it preferred the father as
239
custodian because he was more stable geographically.
The
240
A concurring judge
appellate court upheld the custody order.
argued that it was error to exclude evidence of the father’s
domestic violence, as this was relevant to his fitness as a parent
regardless of whether it took place before or after the stipulated
241
order.
However, even this judge felt that the exclusion was

229. Id. at 1126-27.
230. Id. at 1127.
231. Louisiana’s presumptive statute provides: “If the court finds that both
parents have a history of perpetrating family violence, custody shall be awarded
solely to the parent who is less likely to continue to perpetrate family violence.”
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:364(B) (West 2000).
232. Morrison, 699 So. 2d at 1127. Completion of a treatment program are
mandated by section 9:364(B). Id. at 1128. Such treatment programs are defined
by section 9:362(7). Id.
233. Id. The father was ordered to complete a treatment program before he
could engage in any form of visitation, as required by the statute. Id.
234. 722 So. 2d 54 (La. Ct. App. 1998).
235. Id. at 55.
236. Id. at 58.
237. Id. at 56, 58.
238. Id. at 58.
239. Id. at 60. The mother had remarried, and her new husband was in the
Navy, so they had to relocate periodically. Id. at 61.
240. Id. at 62.
241. Id. at 62-63 (Gonzales, J., concurring).
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242

harmless error.
243
In 1999, the court of appeals decided Hicks v. Hicks and
244
McGee v. McGee. In the Hicks case, the award of joint custody with
the husband having primary custody during the school year was
reversed due to the trial court’s failure to comply with the
245
presumption.
In spite of uncontroverted evidence of severe
domestic violence by the husband, the trial court did not apply the
presumption statute, instead the court used a best interests
246
analysis.
In reversing this, the appellate court also explicitly
247
248
rejected language from the Simmons court.
The Simmons court
had added two more factors to the statutory language: 1) whether
the violence occurred in the presence of the children, and
249
2)whether the violence was provoked.
250
In McGee, using a best interests analysis, the same court
upheld the trial court’s award of joint custody with the husband
251
having primary custody.
The court stated that a single specific
incident of family violence was insufficient to trigger the
252
253
There were allegations of mutual abuse.
Both
presumption.
parties were arrested during one incident, but apparently neither
was actually injured and thus not meeting the statutory
requirement that there be serious bodily injury if there was only
one incident.
The following year the appellate court decided Harper v.
254
Harper.
This time, based on a best interest analysis, the award of
255
sole custody to the mother was upheld.
The father had not
abused the mother since they separated very early in the
256
relationship. However, the father had been physically abusive to
257
his prior wife and children.
Without explanation, the appellate
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

Id. at 63.
733 So. 2d 1261 (La. Ct. App. 1999).
745 So. 2d 708 (La. Ct. App. 1999).
733 So. 2d at 1262.
Id. at 1263.
Simmons v. Simmons, 649 So. 2d 799 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
733 So. 2d at 1265-66.
Simmons, 649 So. 2d at 802.
McGee v. McGee, 745 So. 2d 708 (La. Ct. App. 1999).
Id. at 712.
Id.
Id. at 711-12.
764 So. 2d 1186 (La. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 1190.
Id. at 1187, 1190.
Id. at 1191.
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court did not mention the presumption against custody to
perpetrators, even though it is not limited to abuse against the
258
The court
other parent or the child whose custody is at issue.
considered the statutory presumption favoring joint custody,
though it found that the mother had overcome this, based partly
on the father’s history of violence and partly on his failure to
259
establish a relationship with the child.
The fact that the court
would even consider awarding joint custody to a batterer and child
abuser is, of course, cause for great concern.
260
The most recent Louisiana case on point is Lewis v. Lewis. In
this case the presumption was key to the holding. The trial court
261
Nonetheless, the
had found that the husband abused the wife.
trial court awarded the parties joint custody, with the husband as
primary domiciliary parent, refusing to apply the provisions of the
262
presumption statute.
The appellate court held that the refusal
was reversible legal error, noting that the husband had admitted to
263
The court
having abused the wife on more than one occasion.
264
used this fact to distinguish the case from Simmons and triggered
265
the presumption. The husband had also alleged that the wife was
266
However, the appellate court held that the
violent towards him.
abuse had occurred on only one occasion, did not result in serious
267
injury and thus did not trigger the presumption.
It further held
that the husband had not rebutted the presumption, awarding the
wife custody and the husband supervised visitation until he satisfied
268
all the statutory requirements.
Both parents were ordered to
269
complete parenting classes.

258. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:364(A) (West 2000) (stating that “no parent
who has a history of perpetrating family violence shall be awarded sole or joint
custody of children,” but not specifying that such family violence may be
considered solely in reference to the other parent seeking custody or the child
whose custody is at issue).
259. Harper, 764 So. 2d at 1190.
260. 771 So. 2d 856 (La. Ct. App. 2000).
261. Id. at 858.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 860.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 861-62.
267. Id. at 862.
268. Id.
269. Id.
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3. Jurisdictions With A Moderate Amount of Experience Applying
the Presumption
a. Jurisdictions with No Appellate Cases
In many of the jurisdictions that have had the presumption for
some years, there is not yet any appellate law involving custody
cases with allegations of abuse from one adult partner toward
another. These jurisdictions include the District of Columbia,
Hawaii, Idaho, and South Dakota. However, advocates in three of
these have commented on their experience with the statutes.
(1) District of Columbia
The presumption in the District of Columbia applies only in
270
cases where the court is considering an award of joint custody.
One attorney specializing in domestic violence family law cases
there stated that batterers are now going to court quickly to file for
271
civil protective orders in order to benefit from this presumption.
She also reported that batterers are zealously opposing such orders
in order to prevent the court from finding that the presumption
272
has been triggered.
She noted that if the court finds that this
presumption has not been raised, the court then applies another
273
presumption, favoring joint custody.
A clinical professor at Georgetown University Law School
274
stated that while the statute requires judges to give written
statements specifying factors and findings supporting custody to
275
In
batterers, she believes that this section is “usually ignored.”
any event, she was not sure that an appellate decision requiring
judges to make such findings would actually alter the outcomes,
276
given the frame of mind of the trial court judges.

270. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-911(a)(5) (1997).
271. E-mail from Susana SáCouto, attorney at W.E.A.V.E. (Women Escaping A
Violent Environment) in Washington D.C. to author, Professor of Law, University
of California at Berkeley (June 15, 2001) (on file with author).
272. Id.
273. Id. See also D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-911(a)(5) (1997).
274. Id. § 16-911(a)(1).
275. E-mail from Prof. Lisa DeSanctis, clinical professor at Georgetown
University Law School, to author, Lecturer, University of California at Berkeley
(June 13, 2001) (on file with author).
276. Id.
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(2) Hawaii
277

A lawyer
Hawaii adopted its presumption statute in 1996.
specializing in domestic violence family law cases says that the
278
While there have been
judicial response has been quite mixed.
no problems regarding the issuance of restraining orders, if the
batterer agrees to the order, no finding of domestic violence is
279
made.
When findings are made, the issue of the violence is
usually not re-litigated in the later divorce proceeding, but the
280
impact the violence has had on the children often is.
In terms of what is required to rebut the presumption, some
judges require the batterer to have had “a major turnaround,” or
evidence that the victim is an active drug user or has a mental
281
illness. Other judges take the position that if the batterer has not
hit anyone recently and has taken some classes for batterers he has
282
overcome the presumption.
One of the main problems is that
the guardians ad litem do not apply the new statute correctly, and
283
The judges
often see the presumption as very easily rebutted.
tend to place great weight on the recommendation of these
284
guardians.
However, according to this attorney, victims of domestic
violence who have competent counsel have a great success rate in
285
terms of getting custody, often at the settlement stage.
On the
other hand, unrepresented litigants and those with attorneys who
286
think domestic violence is not that relevant to custody do poorly.
The attorney also noted that the statute used to include a
provision that if the judge awarded custody to a perpetrator, he or
she had to make written findings regarding how the presumption
was overcome and how the safety of the adult victim and the

277. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-46 (Michie 1999).
278. E-mail from an anonymous source in Hawaii to author, Professor of Law,
University of California at (July 18, 2001) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Anonymous E-mail].
279. This attorney noted that issuance of orders without findings raises the
question whether there is subject matter jurisdiction. Id. She will be discussing
this with the judiciary soon. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
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287

children had been considered.
With no notice to the public or
opportunity to comment, this provision was mysteriously removed
288
While
when the statute was amended for some other purpose.
the advocates have been trying to get the provision reinstated, the
judges’ association testified against this legislation, saying it would
289
create too much work for them.
(3) South Dakota
290

The
South Dakota passed its presumption statute in 1997.
Director of the South Dakota Coalition Against Domestic Violence
and Sexual Assault reported that they have had better luck with the
291
While there are still major problems with
law than anticipated.
custody cases involving domestic violence, the situation is better
292
Like many of the respondents around the country,
than before.
this advocate reported that it is hard to get the judges to come to
293
training on domestic violence.
She noted that there must be a
conviction before the presumption is triggered, and there are few
convictions since the prosecutors tend to agree to “deferred
294
prosecution.”
But overall the law is working, and the Chief
Justice of the South Dakota Supreme Court has been proactive on
295
domestic violence issues generally, setting a positive tone.
b. Jurisdictions With Appellate Cases
In several of the states where the presumption has been in
effect for a few years, appellate courts have interpreted the
287. Hawaii statute states that “[a] court may award visitation to a parent who
commited family violence only if the court finds that adequate provisions for the
physical safety and psychological well-being of the child and adequate provision
for the safety of the parent who is a victim of family violence can be made.” HAW.
REV. STAT. ANN.. § 517-46(10) (Michie 1999).
288. Anonymous E-mail, supra note 279.
289. Id.
290. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-45.5 (Michie 1999).
291. Telephone Conversation Verlaine Gullickson, Director of the South
Dakota Coalition Against Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault, with author (Aug.
10, 2001).
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. Ms. Gullickson also noted the biggest problem presented by these
cases is the judges’ refusal to order that the batterers relinquish their firearms, as
mandated by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) and (9). Id. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(8) & (9)
(1994 & Supp. 1999) (other sections have been held unconstitutional).
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presumption, with very mixed results. These include Alabama,
Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, and
Oklahoma.
(1) Alabama
Alabama enacted a rebuttable presumption statute effective
296
July 31, 1995. The statute appears to have had a significant effect,
judging from the outcome of the appellate decisions.
Most of the cases citing the statute emphasize the need for trial
courts to make written findings regarding any allegations of abuse
so that the appellate courts can determine whether the
presumption has been triggered, and if so, whether it has been
297
rebutted. So far this has occurred in six cases; in all of these, the
trial courts had awarded primary physical custody to the fathers, all
of whom were allegedly batterers, but the appellate courts reversed
298
and remanded the cases.
However, in the most recent case on point in Alabama, Ex parte
299
Fann, the Alabama Supreme Court held that it was not automatic
grounds for reversal for the trial court to fail to make a finding on
300
the record as to whether domestic abuse had in fact occurred. In
301
the process, the high court overruled Fesmire v. Fesmire. While the
high court agreed that such a finding is useful so that the appellate
court can determine whether the trial court actually applied the
appropriate statute, it characterized the failure to make such a
302
finding as harmless error. The high court stated in its reasoning
that the statute itself did not specifically require such a finding, nor

296. ALA. CODE § 30-3-151 (1995).
297. See A.S. v. G.T., No. 2000264, 2001 WL 259278, at *2 (Ala. Civ. App. Mar.
16, 2001); Nye v. Nye, 785 So. 2d 1147, 1149 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000); Ray v. Ray, 782
So. 2d 797, 798 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000); Davis v. Davis, 743 So. 2d 486, 487 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1999); Fesmire v. Fesmire, 738 So. 2d 1284, 1285 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999); M.J.Y.
v. J.S.Y., 758 So. 2d 571, 574 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999).
298. A.S., 2001 WL 259278 at *2-3; Nye, 785 So. 2d at 1151; Ray, 782 So. 2d at
799; Davis, 743 So. 2d at 487; Fesmire, 738 So. 2d at 1287-88; M.J.Y., 758 So. 2d at
574.
299. Ex parte Fann, No. 1992227, 2001 WL 793009 (Ala. July 13, 2001).
300. Id. at *7.
301. 738 So. 2d 1284 (Ala. Ct. App. 1999). Fesmire held that if allegations of
domestic abuse have been made, then “the trial court must, on the basis of the
evidence presented, make a finding on the record as to whether domestic abuse
occurred and then . . . it must apply the remaining provisions of the Custody and
Domestic or Family Abuse Act.” Id. at 1288.
302. Ex parte Fann, 2001 WL 793009, at *3.
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did it actually require that the trial court state any reason for its
303
The state supreme court also stated in dicta that there
order.
were many factors besides domestic violence committed by a parent
which should be given great weight in custody determinations but
304
which were not mentioned in the custody statute.
The Alabama appellate court has also addressed other issues
presented by the statute. The first case to mention the new statute
305
was Kent v. Green, in which the appellate court upheld the custody
award to the father in spite of his history of violence toward the
306
mother.
At one point the mother had to be hospitalized due to
307
Applying a best interests test, the
the father’s choking her.
majority opinion did not mention the new statute, which had
308
become effective after the action was filed.
The majority stated
that the father was unlikely to be violent in the future, and that the
309
The dissent
violence had not been directed toward the child.
argued that it was an abuse of discretion to award custody to the
310
Additionally,
father and not to appoint a guardian ad litem.
given the enactment of the new statute, which arguably could
apply, it argued that the case should be remanded to the trial
311
court.
The following year the appellate court decided Jackson v.
312
Jackson, the first Alabama case in which the presumption against
313
The trial court awarded joint
custody to a batterer was applied.
314
custody based on a statutory preference for this.
The court did
not mention the new domestic violence statute and concluded that
315
The appellate court held that
the parents were equally fit.
because the domestic violence statute was more specific than the
316
joint custody statute, the former controls.
Thus in domestic
violence cases, the court may not consider joint custody unless the
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.

Id. at *5.
Id.
701 So. 2d 4 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996).
Id. at 6.
Id. at 5.
See id. at 5-6.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 9.
709 So. 2d 46 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997).
Id.
Id. at 47.
Id.
Id. at 47-48.
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perpetrator has rebutted the presumption against custody to him
317
or her. Since the wife’s evidence had raised the presumption, the
case was reversed and remanded to determine whether the
318
husband could rebut it.
319
In 1998, the appellate court decided Harbert v. Harbert, in
which both parents sought to modify the split custody
320
arrangement.
Three years after their divorce, the mother was
granted a restraining order based on the father’s recent abuse of
321
her. At the subsequent custody hearing, the trial court refused to
322
hear the children’s testimony or to accept an offer of proof.
It
323
then granted the father’s request for joint custody. The appellate
court held that this was reversible error, as was issuing the
restraining order without making a finding that abuse had or had
324
not occurred.
It also reminded the trial court that joint custody
could not be awarded in domestic violence cases until the
perpetrator had rebutted the presumption against custody to
325
him.
326
The following year the court decided E.M.C. v. K.C.Y.,
involving a modification of a joint custody order with primary
327
The trial court granted the
physical custody to the father.
328
mother’s request to modify this to sole custody to her. The father
was not only abusive to the mother and child, but also had a violent
329
Citing the statutory presumption against
outburst in court.
custody to batterers, the appellate court held that joint custody was
not in the best interest of the child, and that the father should not
even be allowed visitation until he receives “professional
330
counseling.”
More recently the Alabama appellate court decided Howard v.

317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

Id. at 48.
Id.
721 So. 2d 224, 224 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998).
Id.
Id. at 226.
Id. at 225.
Id.
Id. at 226.
Id.
735 So. 2d 1225 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999).
Id.
Id. at 227.
Id.
Id. at 1228, 1230.
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331

Howard, in which the mother was given custody and the father
332
333
appealed. The appellate court upheld the trial court’s findings.
The appellate court held that the absence of written findings of
abuse was at most harmless error, as the record showed that the
father had abused her and the children, and there were no
334
allegations that the mother had committed abuse.
The dissent
argued that findings were still required in the event that the father
later filed for modification and in order to determine whether the
children and mother were adequately protected by the visitation
335
336
order. The same result occurred in Ex Parte Fann, the first case
in which the Alabama Supreme Court addressed the issue of the
presumption statute. In that case, the court held that lack of a
finding on the issue of abuse was not automatic grounds for
reversal.
(2) Delaware
There appear to be only two cases interpreting the Delaware
presumption statute, both quite recent, and in both of which the
statute was determinative. The first is a trial court case, J.D.E. v.
337
C.K.W., in which the custodial mother sought to relocate to
338
another state.
Her new husband and their children had already
339
moved there due to the husband’s job.
The father, who had
visitation, had been convicted of assaulting the mother, thus
340
triggering the presumption. However, he had not completed the
program for perpetrators necessary to rebut it, nor had he
demonstrated extraordinary circumstances that warrant the
341
rejection of the presumption. Therefore, the court held that the
342
presumption controlled and allowed the mother to move.
The
court stated that once the father had completed the batterers’
331. No. 2990803, 2001 WL 111261 (Ala. Civ. App. Feb. 9, 2001).
332. Id. at *1.
333. Id. at *2.
334. Id. at *1-2.
335. Id. at *2 (Yates, J., dissenting).
336. No. 1992227, 2001 WL 793009 (Ala. July 13, 2001).
337. No. CN94-11773, 2001 WL 493117 (Del. Fam. Ct. Jan. 25, 2001)
338. Id. at *1.
339. Id.
340. Id. at *2. The Delaware statute does not require a conviction, but merely
that the parent be a “perpetrator of domestic violence,” which is not defined by
the statute or case law. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 705A (a) & (b) (1999).
341. J.D.E., 2001 WL 493117 at *2.
342. Id. at *3.
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343

program, a full hearing would be scheduled.
344
The other case, Webb v. Pfusch, was decided by the Delaware
345
Supreme Court.
In Webb, the father’s visitation rights had been
346
suspended by a one-year restraining order.
The mother was
347
The
granted sole legal custody and primary residential custody.
father had pled guilty to burglarizing the mother’s residence and
assaulting her, but claimed that her testimony at the custody
348
hearing was false. In a very brief opinion, the Delaware Supreme
Court upheld the trial court’s decision, citing to the presumption
statute, and holding that there was no merit to any of the father’s
349
contentions.
(3) Florida
350

Florida’s rebuttable presumption statute, enacted in 1995,
351
has resulted in only four appellate decisions.
This statute
requires evidence of a felony conviction before the presumption is
352
raised and thus is rarely invoked. Judging by both appellate cases
and comments from attorneys practicing in the state, the statute
appears to have had little effect on the day-to-day custody decisions
353
made by trial courts.
In fact, the Florida standard for triggering
the presumption is so high that so far there is no appellate case in
343. Id.
344. No. 275,2000, 2001 WL 760817 (Del. Super. Ct. June 14, 2001).
345. There is no intermediate appellate court in Delaware.
346. Webb, 2001 WL 760817 at *1.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. FLA. STAT. ch. 61.13 (1995) (amended by Act of April 16, 2001, ch. 2001-2,
sec. 1, § 61.13, 2001 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 2001-2 (2001)).
351. See Burke v. Watterson, 713 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998);
Fullerton v. Fullerton, 709 So. 2d 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Ford v. Ford 700
So. 2d 191 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Ward v. Ward, 742 So. 2d 250 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1996).
352. See FLA. STAT. ch. 61.13(2)(b)(2) (West 1997).
353. E-mail from Celia Yapita, attorney in North Central Florida, to author,
Professor of Law, University of California at (June 13, 2001) (on file with the
author). Ms. Yapita, an attorney specializing in domestic violence civil cases,
reports that the presumption rarely arises because most abusers are not arrested,
much less convicted of a felony. Id. Most of the judges she has appeared before
give very little, if any, weight to domestic violence allegations if there are no
charges or convictions. Id. Judges do routinely grant injunctions for protection,
but they also usually grant unsupervised visitation to abusers. Id. Unless the abuse
is severe and documented, most judges in her area do not believe the violence has
affected or will affect the children. Id.
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which a mother was awarded custody as a result of it. In the only
case in which the statute was found applicable, the father had killed
354
the mother.
In the first appellate case decided after the statute was enacted,
355
Ward v. Ward, the appellate court upheld the trial court’s transfer
356
of primary residential custody from the mother to the father.
This occurred in spite of the father’s conviction and imprisonment
357
The trial court stated that it was
for murdering his first wife.
concerned about the girl’s inappropriate sexual comments and
behavior, which the court felt came from the custodial mother’s
358
being a lesbian.
The new presumption statute was not raised at
trial and the mother did not argue on appeal that this was
359
fundamental error but only reversible error.
Therefore, the
360
The court
appellate court refused to apply the new statute.
concluded that in any event, the father’s remarriage, stable job,
and ownership of property would seem to support a conclusion
361
that he had rebutted the presumption.
362
In the second case, In re Marriage of Ford, the appellate court
reversed the trial court’s award of custody to the father, who had
363
admitted abusing the mother but had not been convicted. Thus,
the presumption statute was not triggered, and the court used a
364
best interests analysis. The trial court found both parents fit, but
awarded the father custody because he was more likely to
365
This followed the “friendly
encourage contact with the mother.
366
parent” provision found in many state statutes.
The appellate
354. See Burke v. Watterson, 713 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
355. 742 So. 2d 250 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
356. Id. at 255.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 252.
359. Id. at 255.
360. Id.
361. Id. This case, which received a great deal of publicity nationally, shows
the lengths to which a conservative court will go in order to prevent a lesbian from
raising her child. It also demonstrates the need for specific rebuttal factors to be
included in statutes creating a presumption against the batterer.
362. 700 So. 2d 191 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
363. Id. at 192.
364. Id. at 196.
365. Id. at 194.
366. Id. The trial court followed the “friendly parent” provision found in many
state statutes. See id. These “friendly parent presumptions” frequently penalize
victims of domestic violence. See Joan Zorza, Protecting the Children in Custody:
Disputes When One Parent Abuses the Other, 29 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1113, 1122 (199596).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2001

43

04_FORMAT.LEMON.10.12.01.DOC

644

11/1/2001 5:58 PM

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 2
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:2

court held that the trial court had abused its discretion, because its
final judgment was “devoid of all but the most minimal mention of
what undoubtedly became the central focus of the testimony
presented to the trial court: an established pattern of domestic
violence perpetrated by the former husband upon the former
367
wife.”
The appellate court also noted that the wife might not be
368
“friendly” to the husband due to her justifiable fear of him.
369
The same result is found in Fullerton v. Fullerton, where the
father’s domestic violence toward the mother was the basis for the
370
award of custody to her. In upholding this, the presumption was
not mentioned by the appellate court, probably because the father
371
was not convicted of the abuse.
372
In Burke v. Watterson, the only Florida case in which the
presumption actually was found to apply, the father had been
373
The custody battle was thus
convicted of killing the mother.
between the convicted father and the mother’s parents. The
appellate court upheld the trial court’s determination that the
374
father had not rebutted the presumption.
The grandparents
375
were awarded custody.
(4) Iowa
376

This statute
Iowa enacted its presumption statute in 1995.
applies only to joint custody awards, though domestic violence is
367. Ford, 700 So. 2d at 195.
368. Id. at 196. Nina Zollo states that the Ford case was very helpful in
reversing a trial court that had not follow the statute. Email from Nina Zollo, the
Legal Director of the Greenberg Traurig/Florida Coalition Against Domestic
Violence Alliance for Battered Women, to author, Professor of Law, University of
California at (June 18, 2001) (on file with author). She said that this case may be
why there do not seem to be problems with judges following the statute, or
unintended consequences. Id.
369. 709 So. 2d 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
370. Id. at 163.
371. Id. Apparently it is rare in Florida for a batterer to be convicted, as even
in the largest city in that state, diversion is used in most misdemeanor domestic
violence cases. See Dana Canedy, Officials Drop Criminal Charge Arising in Miami
Mayor’s Spat, N.Y.TIMES, August 7, 2001, at http://www.nytimes.com
/2001/08/07/national/07MIAMI.html (quoting the Miami-Dade state attorney as
saying this is the standard disposition for first time offenders charged with
misdemeanor battery).
372. 713 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
373. Id. at 1095.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41 (West Supp. 2001).
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377

also a best interests factor if the presumption does not apply.
Iowa has only three appellate cases on point, two of which call into
question the usefulness of this limited version of the
378
presumption. However, in the most recent case, the presumption
was the key factor in reversing an award of custody to the
379
batterer.
380
In the first case, In re Marriage of Ford, the trial court awarded
381
The trial
joint custody, with the husband as primary caretaker.
court appeared to be unaware of the new statute, as the court did
not mention this in its order, nor did it discuss in any detail the
evidence creating a presumption against joint custody in domestic
382
violence cases. In spite of this omission, the Iowa Supreme Court
383
upheld the trial court order.
The Iowa Supreme Court stated
that the trial court “gave careful thought to the domestic abuse
issue and found that it was not significant enough to be the sole
384
factor in determining custody of the children.”
The state
supreme court also held that the husband had rebutted the
presumption against joint custody by showing changes in his life
385
since the last incident of abuse four years earlier. These changes
included getting help from his family and church, becoming an
active church member, earning his college degree, obtaining a full
386
time job, and overcoming his substance abuse problems. Though
he never went to a batterer’s program, the husband was found to
be the more stable parent, since the wife had moved out to live with
387
her boyfriend and left the children with the husband.
388
In the second Iowa case, In re Marriage of Forbes, the mother
and father were given joint custody and the father was awarded
primary physical care even though he had pled guilty to abusing
377. Id. § 598.41(2)(c).
378. See In re Ford, 563 N.W.2d 629 (Iowa 1997); In re Marriage of Forbes, 570
N.W.2d 757 (Iowa 1997); In re Sulzner, No. 99-1400, 2000 WL 504728, *2 (Iowa Ct.
App. Apr. 28, 2000).
379. In re Sulzner, 2000 WL 504728 at *2.
380. 563 N.W.2d 629.
381. Id. at 630.
382. Id. at 629-34.
383. Id. at 634. Iowa has no intermediate appellate court. Thus, both cases
interpreting the statute are from the state supreme court.
384. Id. at 632.
385. Id. at 632-33.
386. Id. at 633.
387. Id. at 634. The Iowa statutes, like most presumption statutes, do not
include specific rebuttal factors that the court must consider.
388. 570 N.W.2d 757 (Iowa 1997).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2001

45

04_FORMAT.LEMON.10.12.01.DOC

646

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 2
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

11/1/2001 5:58 PM

[Vol. 28:2

the wife, there were several police reports of his abuse, and the wife
389
had obtained a protective order. The court found that the wife’s
discipline of the children was very abusive and that both parents
390
had abused each other.
The trial court failed to discuss the
presumption statute in its order, or to find whether the
391
presumption had been triggered or rebutted.
In upholding the
trial court’s order, the Iowa Supreme Court stated that it was not
sure that the wife had shown a “history” of domestic abuse by the
392
husband.
It further held that the husband had rebutted any
presumption against him by the evidence that the wife had been
393
abusive to him and to the children.
394
In the most recent case, In re Sulzner, the presumption was the
key factor in the trial court’s decision to award custody to the
395
The custody
mother, with supervised visitation to the father.
award was upheld by the appellate court, although the visitation
issue was remanded, with instructions to order unsupervised
396
visitation.
The father had been convicted of domestic assault
397
against the mother.
The appellate court noted that if there was
only one documented incident, that might not have triggered the
398
However, in this case there was credible evidence
presumption.
399
that the father had repeatedly abused the mother. His attempt to
rebut the presumption by citing his completion of a court-ordered
400
batterers’ education program was rejected by the trial court. The
supreme court agreed with this holding, noting that “[the father’s]
post-separation hostility towards [the mother] suggests he does not
understand the extent to which his abusive behavior adversely
401
affects [the child].”

389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.

Id. at 759.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 760.
Id.
No. 99-1400, 2000 WL 504728, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2000).
Id. at *2.
Id. at *2-*3.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *2.
Id.
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(5) Massachusetts
402

Massachusetts adopted a rebuttable presumption in 1998,
403
which is triggered by a “pattern or serious incident of abuse.”
While the statute is not specifically automatically triggered by the
issuance of a protective order, the underlying facts in the protective
404
order can be grounds for a finding of abuse.
The statute also
states that the court must make written findings regarding the
405
effects of the abuse on the child.
While the legislation was pending, the state senate asked the
state supreme court to given an opinion as to the constitutionality
406
of such a presumption.
The supreme court issued a formal
opinion, holding that this statute would withstand constitutional
407
The high court held that the child’s interest in being
scrutiny.
free of abuse and neglect and the state’s interest in promoting the
welfare of its children outweigh any risk of erroneous deprivation
of the parental right to a relationship with the child which might
result from the application of the “preponderance of the evidence”
standard in a custody proceeding between the parents when there
408
is proof of a pattern of abuse or an incident of serious abuse.
However, in the only case citing the statute to date, In re
409
Custody of Zia,
the appellate court found the statute
410
inapplicable. In that case, the father was awarded sole legal and
physical custody, even though the mother had been the primary
caretaker and the father had been convicted of a drug offense and
411
assault and battery against someone else.
The mother had also
402. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 3 (2001).
403. Id. This is a higher standard than that needed to obtain a protective
order in Massachusetts, which may be one reason there does not seem to have
been any judicial reluctance to issue protective orders for fear of triggering the
presumption against custody to batterers. E-mail from Doug McCormack, Mass.
Attorney/advocate to author, Professor of Law at California at (June 18, 2001)
(on file with author). For a discussion of the Massachusetts statute, see generally
Quirion, supra note 36. For an argument that prior Massachusetts statutes and
case law could serve as the basis for a rebuttable presumption even without a
statute explicitly authorizing this, as well as an argument in favor of such a statute,
see generally Pauline Quirion et al., supra note 49.
404. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A (West Supp. 2001).
405. Id.
406. Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 691 N.E.2d 911, 917 (Mass. 1998).
407. Id.
408. Id. at 916.
409. 736 N.E.2d 449 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000).
410. Id. at 454.
411. Id. at 451.
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obtained two protective orders against him, and the father faced
pending assault charges, though it is unclear from the decision who
412
the victim was. In spite of all this evidence of the father’s abuse,
the trial court used a best interests analysis, barely mentioning the
413
The appellate court affirmed the trial
presumption statute.
court’s order, dismissing the domestic violence issue in one short
414
paragraph.
It stated that the trial court had “considered the
question of abuse and was of the opinion that the present case
presented no history or pattern of domestic violence that would
415
preclude an award of custody to the father.”
The presumption
against custody to batterers was mentioned only in passing, in a
416
The case is troubling, as it raises the question as to
footnote.
what triggers the presumption. If two protective orders, an assault
conviction, and a pending assault charge are not “a history or
417
pattern of domestic violence,” what is?
(6) Minnesota
In 1990, Minnesota enacted its presumption statute, applicable
418
only in joint custody cases.
Since then, there have been only
three appellate cases decided regarding domestic violence
419
Two of the three are unpublished
allegations in custody battles.
and only one even mentions the presumption statute. Thus, the
statute appears not to have been particularly effective in ensuring

412. Id.
413. Id.
414. Id. at 456.
415. Id.
416. Id. at 456 n.12. “The mother makes no argument that the father’s
conduct constitutes a pattern or serious incident of abuse that would give rise to
the rebuttable presumption contained in §10(e).”
417. Given the pre-presumption decision by the Massachusetts Supreme Court,
in which the court held that it was reversible error not to make findings of fact on
domestic violence in a custody case where domestic violence had been an issue,
Custody of Vaughn, 664 N.E.2d 434, 440 (Mass. 1996), Zia appears actually to be a
step backward.
418. MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (2000). Loretta Frederick, a prominent domestic
violence advocate and attorney in Minnesota, reported that there has been no
backlash to the presumption statute because it is so weak.
Telephone
Conversation Loretta Frederick, Attorney, with author (July 16, 2001).
419. See Schmid v. Schmid, No. C9-99-1080, 2000 WL 108785 (Minn. Ct. App.
Feb. 1, 2000); Canning v. Wieckowski, No. C4-98-1638, 1999 WL 118509 (Minn. Ct.
App. Mar. 9, 1999); Nazar v. Nazar, 505 N.W.2d 628 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (review
denied, Oct. 28, 1993) (superseded by statute as stated in Papetti v. Papetti, No.
C2-99-563, 2000 WL 31789 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2000)).
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that domestic violence is given great weight by custody judges.
420
In the first case, Nazar v. Nazar, the trial court had awarded
custody to the father where the mother had left the state with the
421
children and defaulted in the divorce, having had no notice of it.
Though the appellate court did not mention the presumption
against joint custody in domestic violence cases, it did reverse the
422
trial court’s custody decision, based on a best interests analysis. It
reasoned that at the foundation of the dissolution were the
allegations that the father physically, emotionally and verbally
abused the mother and children. It stated that the trial court must
seriously examine any allegations of child abuse before determining
423
custody.
The allegations of spousal abuse disappeared in this
holding. Since the trial court had not undergone a serious
examination of any of the allegations, the appellate court
424
reversed.
The appellate court also disagreed with the trial court
finding that the mother had “falsely” and “maliciously” alleged that
the father had been violent in order to obtain emergency custody
425
jurisdiction from another state.
426
In the second case, Canning v. Wieckowski, the appellate court
affirmed the order granting custody of the child to the father in a
427
While the
case where both parties alleged abuse by the other.
mother had been granted an order of protection, no findings of
428
abuse were made at that time. The court appointed evaluator was
of the opinion that the mother had fabricated the allegations of
abuse, and the trial court found no substantial evidence that the
alleged abuse had any effect on the child, relying on the evaluator’s
429
report.
The court also found that the father was the more
430
friendly parent, and that the mother “demonized” the father.
The case does not mention the presumption, perhaps because joint
custody was not being considered, and the Minnesota presumption
420. 505 N.W.2d at 628.
421. Id. at 638.
422. Id. at 633.
423. Id. (citing Uhl v. Uhl, 395 N.W.2d 106, 111 (Minn. App. Ct. 1986).
424. Id..
425. Id. at 634.
426. No. C4-98-1638, 1999 WL 118509 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 1999).
427. Id. at *1.
428. Id. at *5.
429. Id. at *4. The court stated that,”[h]ere, a thorough custody evaluation of
both parties and the child was completed; the court had no need to investigate
further.” Id. at *4 n.5.
430. Id. at *5.
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is not relevant when the court awards sole custody to either parent.
The most recent case and the only one that mentions the
431
presumption is Schmid v. Schmid. In this case, the trial court held
that the presumption against joint custody was triggered by the
mother’s evidence that there were numerous instances of physical
and verbal abuse by the father, and by an order of protection
432
ordering the father to leave the household.
However, the trial
court also found that the presumption was rebutted when the
father produced evidence that the abuse occurred more than four
433
years ago and had not been repeated.
Then turning to a best
434
It
interests analysis, the court awarded custody to the father.
reasoned that the abuse did not affect the parties’ ability to coparent, the children had developed a good relationship with the
father, and the mother, if awarded sole physical custody, would
restrict the father’s access to the children, which would not be in
435
their best interest.
The father, on the other hand, was found to
436
The court of appeals affirmed the
be the more friendly parent.
437
trial court’s award of joint legal and physical custody. This case is
illustrative of the need for specific factors that the court must
consider in determining whether the presumption has been
438
rebutted. The Minnesota statute contains no such factors.
In
their absence, courts are free to create their own standards.
(7) Case Study: An Unsuccessful Attempt to Pass Stronger
Legislation
While Minnesota’s statute does not seem to have much effect
on the outcome of custody cases at present, it is not an easy matter
to pass stronger legislation. The experience of advocates during
the 2001 legislative session is an interesting case in point.
A retired Minnesota judge, Mary Louise Klas, stated that she
has been intrigued for many years by the reluctance of the judiciary

431. No.C9-99-1080, 2000 WL 108785 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2000).
432. Id. at *1.
433. Id. at *2.
434. Id.
435. Id. at **1-2.
436. Id. at *2. The court noted that father acknowledged the importance of
the mother in the child’s like and that the mother did not reciprocate this
importance of the father’s role. Id. at *4.
437. Id.
438. MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (2000).
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439

to recognize and understand domestic violence in custody cases.
Since this did not improve with the appointment of more women
to the bench, her conclusion was that this was not an issue of the
gender of the judges, but that other factors were the cause,
440
She stated that family court
including very busy calendars.
calendars are a “cattle call,” and that judges are pressured to keep
the cases moving, giving them no time to stop and question
allegations of domestic violence, or to issue the statutorily
441
mandated findings required under the best interests statute. She
also mentioned that the attorneys are often not vigorously pursuing
442
the arguments to make judges issue such findings. Furthermore,
the Minnesota statute provides that joint custody is presumed to be
in the best interests of the children except in domestic violence
443
cases.
Thus in cases where domestic violence has actually taken
place but the court does not believe the allegations, joint custody is
444
often awarded.
Even when the presumption is not applicable, Minnesota’s best
interests statute requires judges to consider the effects of domestic
445
violence on children.
However, “this is consistently ignored”
according to Cyndi Cook, the former Legislation and Public Policy
446
Coordinator for the Minnesota Coalition for Battered Women.
447
Partly in response to this, in 2001, the Minnesota State Bar, in
conjunction with the Coalition and the Domestic Violence
Legislative Alliance, sponsored legislation that would have
448
strengthened the state’s custody laws in domestic violence cases.
The first version would have extended the rebuttable presumption
to sole custody cases, but was never introduced due to opposition
439. Telephone Conversation with Mary Louise Klas, retired judge (July 31,
2001). Judge Klas is part of a group of attorneys, advocates, and academics
currently drafting Minnesota domestic violence custody legislation.
440. Id.
441. Id.
442. Id.
443. MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (2)(d) (2000).
444. Klas Telephone Conversation, supra note 439.
445. MINN. STAT. § 518.17.
446. Telephone Conversation with Cyndi Cook, former Legislation and Public
Policy Coordinator, Minnesota Coalition for Battered Women (July 30, 2001).
447. This sponsorship was the result of a domestic violence expert, Loretta
Frederick, working closely with the State Bar Family Law Section for several years.
Frederick Telephone Conversation, supra note 418.
448. Id.; E-mail from Cyndi Cook, former Legislation and Public Policy
Coordinator, Minnesota Coalition for Battered Women to author, Professor of
Law, University of California at (Aug. 5, 2001) (on file with author).
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449

from the Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers.
In addition,
domestic violence advocates heard feedback from other
jurisdictions that a presumption against sole custody to batterers
was sometimes problematic, especially in cases where the batterer
450
has an attorney and the victim does not. Thus, they decided they
were not prepared to move forward with such language at that
451
time.
452
The two companion bills as introduced, S.F. 1212 and H.F.
453
1256, provided that the court must document how any award of
custody or visitation to a batterer best protects the safety and
454
emotional well being of the child and of the other party.
Findings would be required whenever there were allegations of
injury, use of a dangerous weapon, or a pattern of domestic
455
abuse. Domestic abuse would be defined by the Domestic Abuse
456
Act, which governs issuance of orders for protection.
During
legislative hearings, proponents of the bill stated that a “pattern of
domestic abuse” meant two or more acts of domestic abuse,
457
consistent with a Minnesota homicide statute. Thus, according to
Ms. Cook, one threat of abuse, plus one incident in which the
abuser interfered with the victim’s making a 911 call, could
constitute a “pattern of domestic abuse,” triggering the
458
requirement of findings.
This standard is higher than that required by the Domestic
449. Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note 447; Cook E-mail, supra note
448.
450. Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note 447; Cook E-mail, supra note
448.
451. Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note 447; Cook E-mail, supra note
448.
452. S.F. 1212, 82nd Leg. (Minn. 2001).
453. H.F. 1256, 82nd Leg. (Minn. 2001).
454. Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note 446; Cook E-mail, supra note
448.
455. Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note 446; Cook E-mail, supra note
448.
456. Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note 446; Cook E-mail, supra note
448.
457. Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note 446. See MINN. STAT. §
518B.01(2)(a) (2000) (defining domestic abuse as physical harm, bodily injury, or
assault, infliction of fear of one of these, terroristic threats, criminal sexual
conduct). Since the statute does not require more than one of these, presumably
one such act would suffice as grounds for a protective order.
458. Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note 446. This definition did not
actually appear in the 2001 legislation, but may be included in the 2002 version.
See id. § 518B.01(2)(a).
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459

Abuse Act,
which was a deliberate decision made by the
460
They were concerned about the
proponents of the legislation.
significant numbers of victims of domestic violence who are
arrested when they engage in self-defense or in non-legal
461
violence. If the custody statute were triggered by an arrest for the
use of legal violence, that is, self-defense, it could backfire against
462
many victims of domestic violence. Their hope was that in setting
the standard low for protective orders and higher for custody
463
orders, this backlash could be minimized.
However, when the legislation was considered in the state
Senate, conservative Senators insisted on adding a provision
defining how the court would determine whether domestic abuse
464
had occurred.
This amendment required that there had to be
corroboration of the abuse before the court would be required to
465
The corroboration was limited to one of the
make the findings.
following: a prior court finding of domestic abuse, the issuance of
an order for protection, a criminal conviction, or a police report in
466
which the officer observed domestic abuse. At the request of the
State Bar, the legislation was withdrawn, as they could no longer
467
Supporters of the legislation are meeting to
support it.
determine what the legislation should look like in the next
468
session.
The next version will probably include “predominant
aggressor” language, giving the court guidance when there are
469
allegations of abuse by both parties.
However, this provision is
459. See id. § 518B.01(2)(a) (2001).
460. Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note 446.
461. Id.
462. Id.; Cook Email, supra note 448.
463. Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note 446. Loretta Frederick,
another proponent of the legislation, stated that the definition of domestic abuse
in the next version of the bill may be even more narrow, that is physical abuse
alone, in order to minimize problems with backlash and inclusion of victims.
Frederick Telephone Conversation, supra note 418.
464. Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note 446; Cook E-mail, supra note
448.
465. Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note 446; Cook E-mail, supra note
448.
466. Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note 446; Cook E-mail, supra note
448.
467. Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note 446; Cook E-mail, supra note
448.
468. Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note 446; Cook E-mail, supra note
448.
469. Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note 446. Minnesota does not have
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controversial even among proponents of the legislation. Loretta
Frederick, a prominent domestic violence advocate from
Minnesota, is of the opinion that this language should not be
included in a presumption statute, as this would trigger a full trial
on that issue in every case, given the prevalence of batterers
470
asserting that they are actually the victims.
The next domestic violence custody bill in Minnesota may also
address the role of guardians ad litem and child custody evaluators.
This is an issue for two reasons. First, many judges give great
weight, some would say undue weight, to the recommendations of
471
Additionally, guardians ad litem in
these professionals.
Minnesota are sometimes able to cause the parties to change their
custody and visitation agreements, which in at least one case has
472
had fatal results.
During the pendency of the 2001 bill, several members of the
legislature, as well as the matrimonial lawyers association, stated
repeatedly that what a man does to his wife bears no relationship to
473
his parenting. This viewpoint is, of course, what stands in the way
of rebuttable presumption legislation or even legislation mandating
that judges consider domestic violence in custody cases being
passed and implemented around the country. In spite of this
hurdle, it seems likely that eventually the Minnesota legislature will
enact a stronger statute governing custody decisions in which
domestic violence has occurred.

this type of language in its criminal statutes, thus, it would be a new concept for
the entire state. Id. Ms. Cook also stated that during legislative hearings,
proponents of the legislation argued that if there were allegations that both
parties were abusive, it was imperative for courts to make findings, rather than
ruling that the presumption was inapplicable. Id.
470. Frederick Telephone Conversation, supra note 418.
471. Id. Ms. Cook also stated that the Minnesota Supreme Court’s Gender
Fairness in the Courts Task Force is currently examining the role of guardians ad
litem, so this may be another way to redefine this role, require training on
domestic violence. Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note 446.
472. In one recent case described by Cook, the father convinced the guardian
ad litem that he no longer required supervision during the visitation. Cook
Telephone Conversation, supra note 446; Cook E-mail, supra note 448. When he
refused to return the child, and the mother came to the father’s house to get the
child, the father killed the mother. Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note
446; Cook E-mail, supra note 448.
473. Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note 448.
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(8) Nevada
Nevada adopted its presumption statutes on October 1,
474
Since then there have been four appellate cases
1995.
475
Overall, it appears that this statute has made a
interpreting it.
significant difference in how allegations of domestic violence are
treated in custody decisions. However, it also appears that it is
necessary to appeal the decisions in which the statute was ignored
or given little weight, as in every appellate case so far, the trial court
476
order was reversed and remanded.
477
In Lesley v. Lesley, the first Nevada appellate case on point,
the husband was initially awarded custody because the wife
478
defaulted in the divorce. She had fled the state with the children
and obtained temporary custody and a restraining order in the new
479
She and witnesses later testified that there were several
state.
480
occasions on which the husband had struck her, leaving bruises.
However, the Nevada trial court found that this was not a
481
The
meritorius defense and refused to set the decree aside.
Nevada Supreme Court reversed, citing the presumption statute,
and citing the public policy of ensuring that children were not
482
placed with an abusive parent.
483
In McDermott v. McDermott, the initial degree ordered joint
484
The
legal custody and gave the wife primary physical custody.
husband’s motion to modify this in his favor was granted by the
trial court, in spite of the fact that the husband had recently been
convicted of assaulting the wife when she came to pick up the

474. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 125.480 (Michie Supp. 1999).
475. Hayes v. Gallacher, 972 P.2d 1138 (Nev. 1999); Russo v. Gardner, 956
P.2d 98 (Nev. 1998); McDermott v. McDermott, 946 P.2d 177 (Nev. 1997); Lesley
v. Lesley, 941 P.2d 451 (Nev. 1997), overruled by Epstein v. Epstein, 950 P.2d 771
(Nev. 1997).
476. Nevada has no intermediate appellate court; thus all appellate cases are
decided by the state supreme court.
477. 941 P.2d 451.
478. Id. at 452.
479. Id.
480. Id. at 453.
481. Id.
482. Id. at 455-56. The Lesley case was overruled in Epstein v. Epstein on other
grounds. 950 P.2d 771 (Nev. 1997). Epstein held that the respondent does not
need to show a meritorius defense in order to set aside a default judgment of
divorce. Id. at 773.
483. 946 P.2d 177 (Nev. 1997).
484. Id. at 178.
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485

child. The trial court stated that it “understands the provocation
which might have existed,” suggested that the husband go to
domestic violence classes, and threatened to order this unless he
486
went voluntarily.
It did not mention the presumption statute.
This modification was reversed by the Supreme Court, holding that
the trial court was required to consider the rebuttable
487
presumption, which was triggered by the husband’s conviction.
The dissent argued that since the presumption was not raised at the
trial court level, it could not be the basis for reversal, and that the
488
trial court’s decision appeared appropriate.
489
In Russo v. Gardner, there was evidence that the father had
490
abused the mother and two children, one of whom was not his.
He had been convicted of abusing the mother, and there was a
police report regarding his abuse of the woman who brought the
491
children for visitation. In spite of this abuse, the trial court found
that the mother’s testimony was motivated by animus toward the
father, and that the father had equitably adopted the child who was
492
not his.
It granted the parents joint legal custody of both
493
children, with primary physical custody to the mother. The state
supreme court reversed the joint custody award, citing the
presumption statute, which had been triggered and not rebutted,
and noting that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to award custody
494
of the non-biological child to the father.
495
In the most recent Nevada case, Hayes v. Gallacher, the initial
award was also joint legal custody, with primary physical custody to

485. Id.
486. Id. at 179.
487. Id.
488. Id. (Springer, J., dissenting). Contrast the holding in McDermott with that
in Ward v. Ward, 742 So. 2d 250 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996), in which the mother’s
failure to raise the statutory presumption in the trial court was held to preclude
consideration of the statute by the appellate court. Id. See also supra note 355 and
accompanying text (explaining the Ward case).
489. 956 P.2d 98 (Nev. 1998).
490. Id. at 99.
491. Id.
492. Id. at 100.
493. Id.
494. Id. at 103. A factually very similar case is found in Barkaloff v. Woodward,
47 Cal. App. 4th 393 (Ca. Ct. App. 1996). In Barkaloff, a batterer boyfriend was
granted visitation of his ex-partner’s child by the trial court. Id. at 397. This was
reversed by the appellate court due to lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 399.
495. 972 P.2d 1138 (Nev. 1999).
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496

the mother.
The mother had obtained a one year restraining
order against the father based on his abuse of her, and the judge
497
had made a finding that time that domestic violence occurred.
Later, the mother sought permission to relocate with her new
husband and the children to Japan, where the new husband had
498
been transferred by the Air Force.
Without an evidentiary
hearing and also apparently without considering the presumption,
a different judge ordered that custody be transferred from the
499
mother to the father if the mother moved.
The state supreme
court reversed and remanded, ordering the trial court to
reexamine the custody arrangement in light of the presumption
statute, since the presumption had been raised by the earlier
500
finding of domestic violence and had not been rebutted.
(9) Oklahoma
Oklahoma adopted the rebuttable presumption against
501
So far there are only two cases on
custody to batterers in 1991.
502
point, with contrary holdings: Brown v. Brown and Smith v.
503
Smith.
504
The
In Brown, the issue was what triggers the presumption.
505
trial court awarded custody to the father.
There was evidence
that the father had shoved the mother, threatened her with
violence, and broken out the windows in the car of a man who the
506
father believed was having an affair with the mother. The father
507
had also acted similarly on other occasions with third parties.
The trial court quoted the criminal definition of domestic abuse
(physical harm or threat of imminent physical harm), and noted
that the abuse in this case appeared to be “one or two isolated
508
instances of prescribed behavior.” The trial court found that this
behavior did not constitute “ongoing domestic abuse” so as to
496.
497.
498.
499.
500.
501.
502.
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.

Id. at 1139.
Id. at 1141.
Id. at 1139.
Id. at 1141.
Id. at 1142.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 112.2 (West 2001).
867 P.2d 477 (Okla. Ct. App. 1993).
963 P.2d 24 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998).
867 P.2d at 477.
Id.
Id. at 479.
Id.
Id. at 480.
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509

trigger the presumption.
It also appeared to disapprove of the
mother, mentioning that she had propositioned one of the father’s
510
co-workers and stating that she was evasive and dissembling. The
511
appellate court upheld the trial court order.
In Smith, the father was also awarded custody by the trial
512
court.
However, in this case the court of appeals reversed and
remanded, holding that there was clear and convincing evidence of
ongoing domestic abuse by the father, triggering the
513
presumption.
The evidence of abuse included the wife’s
restraining order declaration, in which she alleged that the
husband had physically and verbally abused her, threatened to kill
her, and threatened to kill himself, all in the presence of the
514
child.
There were also several witnesses who testified regarding
515
the father’s abuse of the mother and child. The Smith court held
that the evidence met the test that the abuse be frequent and
recent, and also held that the father had not rebutted the
516
presumption.
c. Jurisdictions Where the Presumption is Very New
As we have seen above, implementation of presumption
statutes is often uneven. However, in some states these statutes
have actually resulted in a backlash towards victims of domestic
violence, as will be described in this section.
In the jurisdictions where the presumption against custody to
batterers is very new, there is not yet any appellate law on point.
However, there are anecdotal accounts of how the law is working
and a survey conducted by four law students in one state. Based on
the history in other jurisdictions where the presumption has been
in effect for several years, it appears that it may be necessary to ask
the appellate courts to intervene before the procedure in the trial
courts actually changes.

509.
510.
511.
512.
513.
514.
515.
516.

Id. at 479-80.
Id. at 479.
Id.
963 P.2d 24, 25 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 26.
Id. at 25.
Id.
Id. at 26.
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(1) Arizona
517

Arizona adopted the presumption effective January 2001. A
lawyer with the Arizona Coalition Against Domestic Violence
reported that the legal committee of the Coalition discussed how
518
the presumption was working six months later, on June 21, 2001.
Their conclusion was that things have worsened since the
519
This attorney stated that there is a
enactment of the statute.
strong preference for joint custody on the part of the judiciary, and
520
that sole custody is awarded almost exclusively in default cases.
She estimated that the local legal advocacy center receives about six
calls each week in which battered mothers are complaining that
judges are refusing to hear evidence of domestic violence, in spite
521
For example, one judge looked at photos
of the new statute.
taken by the police and acknowledged that the violence had been
significant, but then stated that because there was no evidence of a
522
history of violence, the judge would not give any weight to it.
The Arizona statute is internally inconsistent: when it discusses
domestic violence as relevant to joint custody, it requires either
“significant domestic violence” or “a significant history of domestic
523
violence.”
On the other hand, when it discusses custody
generally, it requires only “an act of domestic violence against the
other parent,” defined as intentionally causing or attempting to
cause sexual assault or serious physical injury, or apprehension
thereof, or engaging in a pattern of behavior which would qualify
524
for a protective order. This inconsistency is inherently confusing;
it is hoped that the legislature will amend the statute so that it is
consistent.
While this lawyer said she suspected that the statute might be
helping battered parents at the settlement stage, she had no actual
525
proof of this. She also stated that Arizona has had a statute since
1986 stating that domestic violence is detrimental to children, but
517. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. §25-403(N) (2000).
518. E-mail from Dianne Post, Attorney, Arizona Coalition Against Domestic
Violence, to author, Professor of Law, University of California at (June 26, 2001)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Post E-mail (1)].
519. Id.
520. Id.
521. Id.
522. Id.
523. See ARIZ REV. STAT. § 25-403(E) (2000).
524. See id. § 25-403(N).
525. Post E-mail, supra note 518.
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that it did not seem to make a difference, so it was predictable that
526
the new statute might have the same lack of effect.
(2) Oregon
527

Oregon adopted the presumption effective in 2000. Lawyers
specializing in domestic violence family law cases give mixed
reports at this point. An attorney working for the Oregon
Coalition Against Domestic and Sexual Violence reported that
some unethical attorneys now send their clients to get restraining
orders regardless of whether there has been any history of domestic
528
violence in order to bolster the custody case.
She commented
529
that such orders are fairly easy to obtain in Oregon.
She also
stated that the new statute does not seem to be keeping batterers
from getting custody, probably because the batterers “tend to look
530
better on paper.” She opined that the presumption is fairly easily
rebutted: in cases where the father has a home and job, and does
not suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder or chemical
dependencies, judges are finding that these factors rebut the
531
presumption.
She concluded that the new statute has not been
532
very helpful, other than philosophically.
A staff attorney from Oregon Legal Aid reports that in one
county, the new statute has resulted in a backlash in terms of the
533
issuance of restraining orders.
Characterizing this as a “huge
526. E-mail from Dianne Post, attorney for Arizona Coalition Against Domestic
Violence to author (July 3, 2001) (on file with author) [hereinafter Post Email 2].
This is apparently referring to Arizona Statute section 25-403(M). ARIZ. REV. STAT.
§ 25-403(M) (2000).
527. OR. REV. STAT. § 107.137(2) (2000).
528. E-mail from Katy Yetter, Attorney, Oregon Coalition Against Domestic
and Sexual Violence, to author, Professor of Law, University of California at (June
18, 2001) (on file with author).
529. Id.
530. Id. This appears to be a reference to fact that there are no restraining
order hearings in Oregon unless the respondent requests a hearing. See OR. REV.
STAT. § 107.718 (1999). This was also mentioned by Maureen McKnight, the
Regional Director for Oregon Legal Aid, who said that the fact that restraining
orders are so often issued ex parte means that many judges feel that a finding of
abuse in a restraining order has no effect in a subsequent family law proceeding.
E-mail from Ms. McKnight, Regional Direction for Oregon Legal Aid, to author,
Professor of Law, University of California at (June 18, 2001) (on file with author).
531. Id.
532. Id.
533. E-mail from Caitlin Glass, Attorney, Oregon Legal Aid, to author,
Professor of Law, University of California at (June 16, 2001) (on file with author).
Ms. Glass summarized comments made to her from Legal Aid attorneys in several
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problem” in that county, she stated that judges are continuing
orders without making findings, ordering joint custody prior to any
hearing or trial, or setting up parenting plans without making
534
custody orders. In other counties, however, there does not seem
to be this backlash, though it may be harder to get a restraining
535
order now if the respondent is represented.
Legal Aid attorneys
are also seeing more abusers filing for restraining orders in hopes
536
In terms of orders
of receiving the benefit of the new statute.
issued in dissolution and custody cases, she reported that in some
537
counties, judges are reluctant to apply the new presumption.
Another Oregon attorney stated that the presumption works
well in her county when custody is being decided in a restraining
538
order hearing.
She also stated that these judges accepted the
issuance of a restraining order as preclusive on the issue of whether
539
the presumption had been raised. However, she stated that when
this issue is being decided at a custody trial, judges will easily find
that the presumption has been rebutted if the judge wants to award
540
custody to the abuser.
She said the practice is often to hear all
the evidence, but then to make the decision based on the
traditional best interest factors, finding that these factors rebut the
541
presumption.
This attorney has argued that the new statute
means the court must treat domestic violence as the most
important and primary factor before looking at traditional factors,
and that the abuser must rebut the presumption by engaging in
batterers’ treatment or otherwise demonstrating that the abuse will
542
not impact the child.
However, as of yet, no judge has accepted
543
this argument. She concluded that she would like to see a higher
court interpret the new statute so that the trial courts have
544
guidance on how it is rebutted.

counties. Id.
534. Id.
535. Id.
536. Id.
537. Id.
538. E-mail correspondence from Jud Carusone, Oregon attorney, to author,
Professor of Law, University of California at (June 13, 2001) (on file with author).
539. Id.
540. Id.
541. Id.
542. Id.
543. Id.
544. Id.
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(3) California
In March and April of 2001, a telephone survey was conducted
by four students at Boalt Hall School of Law, UC Berkeley, on how
California’s rebuttable presumption statute, Family Code section
545
3044, was working. This statute became effective January 1, 2000.
The students interviewed twenty-four people from nine counties
throughout the state, including attorneys, judicial officers,
legislative aides, custody evaluators, survivors of domestic violence,
546
domestic violence experts, and community resource people. The
overall conclusions of the students were that the statute’s passage
547
“is a rather hollow victory for social justice,” but also that the new
548
code section is “a positive addition with significant potential.”
The students found that there were major problems with
section 3044 of the California Family Code, consisting of
549
“inconsistent and often distorted implementation.”
The
550
problems fell into four categories. First, there were polarized
551
positions with regard to the purpose of the code section. These
took the form of disagreement as to whether domestic violence is
552
For many years, California has
relevant to the custody decision.
required that judges consider any past domestic violence in every
553
custody decision.
Respondents also disagreed with the provision
in the statute that domestic violence is relevant to legal custody as
554
Finally, some respondents felt
well as physical custody orders.
that judges already adequately considered the occurrence and
555
effect of domestic violence without a statutory directive. Notably,
an earlier survey conducted by the California Alliance Against
Domestic Violence in 1998 found that many judges did not take
domestic violence into account in custody decisions, thus ignoring
556
both prior pieces of legislation on this topic. This lack of judicial
545. Debbie Warren et al., California Family Code § 3044: Passage,
Implementation and Effects 22-23 (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
546. Id. at 22.
547. Id. at 23.
548. Id. at 22.
549. Id. at 23.
550. Id.
551. Id.
552. Id. at 23-26.
553. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011 (West 2000).
554. Warren et al., supra note 545, at 23-24.
555. Id. at 24-25.
556. Id. at 13. The unpublished C.A.A.D.V. survey results are on file with the
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response to the prior legislation was one of the reasons cited to the
legislature in arguing for the enactment of a rebuttable
557
presumption.
The second problem the students found was that many
558
Even
respondents saw the statutory language as ambiguous.
though the California statute is much more specific than many
other presumption statutes, some respondents stated that they
thought the statute should more clearly define what type of finding
559
was necessary in order to trigger the presumption. Additionally,
though the statute contains a list of factors which the court must
consider in determining whether the presumption has been
overcome, as discussed in Part III, some respondents felt that this
section of the statute was still too vague and should provide more
direction to the court (for example, what if the batterer has
560
complied with one or two of the factors but not with the others?).
This request from the judiciary for more specific legislative
directives is ironic, considering that the legislation was opposed by
the California Judges’ Association, who argued that the discretion
of family law judges in making custody decisions should not be
561
further limited.
Third, the survey found that some judges were not resistant to
the presumption and appeared to have adequate resources,
including enough time on court calendars to hold a timely
evidentiary hearing as to whether domestic violence had
562
occurred.
These judges had either always given domestic
violence great weight in making custody decisions, or had recently
changed their court practices and procedures to give this issue
author. One of the prior pieces of legislation was A.B. 200. See infra Part III (H).
557. See Devers, supra note 99, at 3-5. “Providers of services to domestic
violence victims from 12 counties, ranging from Shasta to San Bernardino,
responded to the [C.A.A.D.V.] survey. The result was unanimous that AB 200 is
virtually ignored except in those courts that were already dealing effectively with
domestic violence prior to its passage. One response from Santa Cruz County was
particularly telling: ‘I have never heard a judge here make a specific finding as
mandated by AB 200, and one, when prompted, said he didn’t have to - that was
his order.’” Id. at 5.
558. Warren et al., supra note 545, at 23.
559. Id. at 26-27. The California presumption is triggered by the same low
level of abuse required to qualify for a restraining order. Section 3044 of the
California family code cross references section 6320 of the Domestic Violence
Prevention Act in defining domestic violence.
560. Id. at 24-27.
561. See Devers, supra note 98, at 7-8.
562. Warren et al., supra note 545, at 29, 33-34.
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greater weight.
However, the survey also found that there was substantial
judicial resistance in several counties, due in part to lack of such
564
resources.
Some judges opined that joint custody was almost
565
Judicial
always appropriate, even in domestic violence cases.
officers also stated that they resented statutorily imposed
566
restrictions on their discretion.
Examples of such resistance on
the part of judges took the form of ordering the litigants to
repeatedly try to mediate the dispute in hopes that they would
567
eventually come to an agreement.
Additional examples of
resistance included awarding joint custody in spite of police reports
568
or even prior convictions for domestic violence.
The lack of judicial resources is a very real problem in many
areas. Many judges have severe time constraints on their calendars,
making the presumption yet another hurdle which they have to
569
surmount.
In these courts, judges are faced with a dilemma
regarding how to structure temporary custody and visitation, given
that it may be months before the calendar is free for an actual
evidentiary hearing, so the temporary order is usually based only on
570
allegations.
Finally, the students found that there had been an adverse
impact on the issuance of restraining orders in several California
571
counties.
In these areas, it has become increasingly difficult to
obtain orders; judges are now requiring independent
572
corroboration of the abuse in many cases, and of course many
victims have no such corroboration. This appears to be happening
because judges are leery of triggering the presumption through the
issuance of a restraining order. However, it is unclear whether the
mere issuance of an order is in fact a finding triggering the
presumption. In response to this concern, some judges are
encouraging or requiring the parties to stipulate to the order,
573
which thereby avoids a court finding of abuse. Other judges are
563.
564.
565.
566.
567.
568.
569.
570.
571.
572.
573.

Id. at 33-34.
Id. at 29-33.
Id. at 29-30.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 33.
Id.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 34-37.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 31-32.
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issuing restraining orders but stating on the record that they are
574
(Query whether such
making no finding of domestic violence.
orders would be upheld on appeal, since there appears to be no
basis for the order, and thus no subject matter jurisdiction.) Still
other judges are continuing temporary orders several times rather
than issuing a long-term order after hearing, again hoping to avoid
575
the triggering of the presumption.
The backlash in court response to restraining order requests
has been great in some parts of the state. Some victims have been
discouraged from even seeking judicial remedies for domestic
576
violence. If the victim does seek such help, she is often forced to
go to court several times, which may have serious consequences in
577
terms of her employment, as well as forcing her to confront the
batterer repeatedly. And ironically, the more times the court
requires the victim to return to court, the more court time is spent
on the case, arguably wasting this precious resource, which perhaps
could be better spent holding an evidentiary hearing.
The survey concludes with several recommendations. These
include greater and more consistent implementation of the
578
statute, clarification from the legislature or the appellate courts
579
as to what constitutes a “finding” of domestic violence,
580
eliminating the negative effects on issuance of restraining orders,
581
The survey also
and increased resources for family courts.
recommended educating judges regarding the fact that the
582
presumption is rebuttable, educating attorneys regarding how to
advocate for this new law and how to work with courts on changing
583
existing practices, and educating the public as to the relevance of
domestic violence to custody decisions, given that many litigants
584
have no attorneys.
574. Id. at 32.
575. Id. at 33, 36-37.
576. Id. at 37.
577. While the California Labor Code section 230 protects victims of domestic
violence who take time off to go to court, many victims do not know about these
provisions or how to access legal help to enforce them. CAL. LABOR CODE §230
(West 2000).
578. Warren et al., supra note 545, at 38.
579. Id. at 40-43.
580. Id. at 38.
581. Id. at 47-48.
582. Id. at 44-45.
583. Id. at 47.
584. Id. at 51. One way to educate the public is through each state’s Judicial
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The survey also recommended the alteration of pre-existing
585
roles in family court, along with educating mediators working for
Family Court Services regarding how to address domestic violence
586
cases generally and the use of this new statute in particular. One
of the challenges which will need to be resolved in implementing
this new law in California will be how mediators working for Family
Court Services will deal with domestic violence cases. California
587
mandates mediation of all disputed custody or visitation cases.
While victims of domestic violence may bring a support person to
588
the mediation session, or request a meeting separate from the
589
perpetrator, they are not exempted from the mediation process.
Given that mediators do not usually engage in fact-finding, but that
in many counties they make recommendations to the court, their
procedures may need to be changed, so that they actually
investigate allegations of abuse and then apprise the court of their
590
findings.
Some California attorneys routinely appear in front of the
same judges every week, representing or assisting numerous of
clients from the local restraining order clinics. Several of these
attorneys have expressed an unwillingness to “rock the boat” by
insisting that the judges comply with the new domestic violence
591
custody statutes.
They state that they are concerned that if they
advocate too stridently on behalf of one client, the judge will
retaliate against all the other clients coming from that same
592
agency.
Additionally, judges presiding over these dockets are aware
Council website. See, e.g., Online Self Help Center, http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/
selfhelp (launched by the California Judicial Council). This site includes
information about custody cases and domestic violence issues. Id.
585. Warren et al., supra note 545, at 48-50.
586. Id. at 45-46.
587. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3160 (West 2001).
588. Id. § 6303 (West 2000).
589. Id. § 3181 (West 2000).
590. A proposed California Rule of Court, R1257.2, includes changing the job
description of court-based mediators to include investigation of allegations of
abuse.
If adopted, this will become effective Jan. 1, 2002.
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/invitationstocomment/prevprop.htm (scroll down
to SPR01-22).
591. Conversations between author and anonymous attorneys from the San
Francisco Bay Area on various occasions in spring 2001.
592. Author’s discussions with anonymous attorneys from non-profit agencies
working exclusively with victims of domestic violence and practicing in the San
Francisco Bay Area, spring and summer 2001.
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that the likelihood that a litigant will appeal one of their decisions
is highly unlikely. This is due in part to the high incidence of
parties who represent themselves, in part to the high cost of an
appeal, and in part to the reluctance of attorneys to anger the
judge by appealing judgments. Thus, they are not actually required
to follow the statutory mandates, such as making a formal finding
when ordering joint custody in a case where there are allegations of
593
domestic violence.
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS WITH IMPLEMENTATION
A. Introduction
In a 1995 article examining the effectiveness of the
presumption statutes in effect in eight jurisdictions at that time, the
594
authors came to the following conclusions: 1) The private bar is
remarkably uninformed about domestic violence, and the quality of
representation afforded victims by the bar is uneven. 2) Legal
Services attorneys are relatively well informed about domestic
violence. 3) Few jurisdictions have court systems that are “userfriendly” to Pro Se custody litigants. 4) The judiciary is largely
uninformed about domestic violence and judicial practice is
inconsistent. 5) Specialized court services related to domestic
violence custody cases are sorely wanting. 6) Domestic violence
custody cases are not mandated to mediation in most presumption
states. 7) Evaluators and guardians ad litem utilized by the courts
have minimal specialized training on domestic violence. 8) The
award of a protection order to an abused parent in most
presumption states is not dispositive of the claim of domestic
violence in custody proceedings. 9) The lack of secure supervised
visitation facilities jeopardizes the protective mandates in state
codes.
Additionally, these commentators found that it is not yet clear
that the domestic violence presumptions have effected ameliorative
595
and protective outcomes for children and abused parents.
In
discussing this, the authors noted that while “[e]vidence of
domestic violence is more . . . readily admitted in custody
proceedings now than before statutory reform made domestic
593.
594.
595.

See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 3011, 3020, & 3044 (West Supp. 2001).
Family Violence Project, supra note 18, at 211-222.
Id.
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violence relevant,” resulting in a practice of generally awarding sole
physical custody to victims, courts still were not safeguarding
596
Furthermore, they
women and children from further abuse.
noted that the statutes were sometimes being used against women
597
In most
who defended themselves or their children.
presumption states, however, this was not a serious problem
because the standard for triggering the presumption was high
598
enough that the victims’ actions were not found to have raised it.
What can we learn from all these comments, cases, and
surveys? How do we ensure that domestic violence is given the
weight it deserves in custody disputes without creating even more
problems for victims of abuse? These are complex questions,
without easy solutions. Additionally, the solutions may need to vary
depending on which state and local community are involved.
However, some conclusions can be drawn from this inquiry, and
some recommendations made.
B. Statutory Language
First, statutes of this kind should be carefully worded, giving a
clear definition of what type of abuse is needed in order to trigger
the presumption against custody to a batterer. Additionally, the
statute should clarify what standard of proof, and possibly what type
of evidence is necessary in order to raise the presumption. For
example, does issuance of a restraining order after a hearing
599
automatically trigger the presumption or not?
In making this determination, legislatures might consider
adopting a higher standard of abuse than is used for restraining or
protective orders, as this may minimize judicial reluctance to issue
600
such orders.
In deciding how domestic violence should be

596. Id. at 221. This is presumably a reference to visitation provisions, a source
of great and ongoing danger in many post-divorce families.
597. Id.
598. Id.
599. See W. Kathleen Baker, Rebuttable Presumptions, 2 SYNERGY 2 (published by
Nat. Council of Juv. & Fam. Ct. Judges) (Winter/Spring 1997) and Pincolini, supra
note 56, at 8.
600. For example, the Massachusetts presumption statutes, MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN chs. 208 § 31A, 209 § 38, and 209C § 10 (West Supp. 2001), incorporate a
higher standard than is used in the protective order statute, 209A. The former
requires “a pattern or serious incident of abuse,” while the latter requires only
“one or more of the following acts,” and includes threats and attempted physical
harm as well as actual physical harm or involuntary sexual relations.
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defined in the presumption statute, legislatures must decide
whether to include physical abuse only, or also threats of physical
abuse and destruction of property. It is also possible to include the
infliction of emotional abuse as part of the definition of domestic
601
violence. Of course, if emotional abuse is included, it is advisable
to define this term for purposes of the statute, to prevent a finding
that occasional verbal arguments or infrequent insults were
sufficient to trigger the presumption. Note that there is a split
among domestic violence experts regarding the inclusion of threats
or emotional abuse in presumption statutes. In some cases, statutes
were deliberately very narrowly drawn, in order to prevent a
backlash against victims of domestic violence, who may have at
times made statements which could be interpreted as threats or as
602
emotional abuse.
It is also advisable to define abuse for triggering the
presumption to include abuse against current or former partners,
not just abuse against the co-parent who is contesting the custody
603
of the child.
Statutes such as Minnesota’s allowing either parent to trigger a
presumption favoring joint custody merely by requesting this
should be amended to clarify that the domestic violence
604
presumption trumps any joint custody presumption.
Furthermore, the statute should establish a clear procedure
and standard of evidence for rebuttal of the presumption, with
enumerated factors that the court must consider. This helps
prevent the court from simply making a conclusory statement that
the batterer’s testimony showed that it was in the best interests of
the child to be with him or her, as was the situation in several of the
cases discussed above.
An additional recommendation is that the custody statute
contain a provision requiring judges to make written findings
regarding whether domestic violence has taken place, why custody
or visitation with the abuser has been ordered, and how the
601. Pincolini, supra note 56, at 8.
602. Family Violence Project, supra note 18.
603. See, e.g., Anderson v. Hensrud, 548 N.W.2d 410, 414 (N.D. 1996) (holding
that the presumption could be raised by abuse of other victims besides the coparent).
604. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 30-3-131, 30-3-133 (1975), as discussed in Jackson v.
Jackson, 709 So. 2d 46, 48 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997) (holding that the joint custody
preference is trumped by the rebuttable presumption against custody to
batterers).
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children and adult victim will be protected by the order. This
605
could be triggered by any allegations of abuse, or by a judicial
finding that abuse had occurred. This can both encourage judges
to think carefully about any orders they make and lay a foundation
for appellate review.
Statutes establishing rebuttable presumptions against custody
to batterers should apply to all types of custody, sole or joint, legal
or physical. These statutes need to specifically address the issue of
contact between the children and the abusive parent, clarifying that
the safety of everyone involved is the “bottom line.” In many states,
visitation statutes addressing domestic violence situations are
606
already in place.
In states without such provisions, the
presumption statute should be amended to include language
concerning visitation, or a companion statute should be enacted
covering the issue of visitation in domestic violence cases.
Statutes should also provide that if the presumption is found
not to apply (either because it was not raised, or because it was
rebutted), domestic violence is still a factor that courts must
607
consider when making any custody award.
Statutes such as this
will help ensure that the victim of domestic violence or the
children’s attorney is not starting from scratch, having to prove to
the court that domestic abuse is relevant to the custody decision
even when that abuse has not been sufficient to trigger the
statutory presumption.
Statutes should also incorporate a dominant aggressor analysis,
for the court to apply in cases where there are allegations of mutual
608
abuse.
This analysis should be specifically described, listing the
factors for the court to consider in making its determination, and
clarifying that the issue is not “who started the fight,” but the
history of violence between the parties, whether one party was
injured more severely, and whether there is any evidence of self609
defense.
605. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011 (West Supp. 2001) (containing such a
requirement).
606. See, e.g., id. § 3100.
607. See, e.g., id. § 3011 (continuing to apply even if the presumption statute,
CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044, does not).
608. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:364 (West 2000). This may be called a
“primary aggressor” or “predominant aggressor” determination, as well as
“dominant aggressor.”
609. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 836 (West 2000). However, as noted
previously, at least one prominent domestic violence advocate is of the opinion
that such a provision is not useful in a statute establishing a presumption against
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C. Training
While the actual statutory provisions are important, the mere
passage of the most well-written and comprehensive statute will not
automatically solve the problems presented by cases in which
domestic violence is an issue. One of the key aspects of
implementing any statute is training for everyone involved.
Participants in a 1995 survey on the effectiveness of the
presumption statutes reported that “in those judicial districts and
states where there has been specialized training of the bar, the
‘presumption’ has shaped judicial decision-making and has
produced custody awards designed to safeguard children and
abused parents. In fact, the anticipated changes in practice have
been most noticeable in those jurisdictions where the courts and
610
legal services programs developed specialized programs.”
611
612
Training needs to be provided for judges, mediators, custody
613
614
615
evaluators, family law attorneys, and guardians ad litem. The
training needs to be very specific, addressing the studies leading to
the passage of the state’s presumption statute, the legislative intent
custody to batterers, since its inclusion may trigger many more trials on the
“primary” or “dominant” aggressor issue. Fredrick Telephone Conversation, supra
note 418.
610. Family Violence Project, supra note 18, at 221-22.
611. In 1997, Minnesota passed a law mandating judicial education in the area
of domestic violence and child custody. MINN. STAT. § 480.30 (2000). However,
while such training is offered at the annual state judicial conference, judges are
not actually required to attend. Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note 446.
Such statutes are very rare, and are often opposed by judicial associations on the
grounds that they violate the separation of powers doctrine. The Oregon
Coalition Against Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault is offering statewide
judicial training, focusing on the theme that one cannot be a batterer and a good
parent at the same time. E-mail from Katy Yetter to author (June 19, 2001) (on
file with author).
612. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 1815, 1816, 3110.5 (West 2000).
613. See, e.g., id. § 3110.5 (West Supp. 2001); CAL. RULES OF COURT § 1257.7
(West 2001) (mandating annual training on domestic violence for custody
evaluators).
614. In several of the appellate cases discussed above, the attorneys seemed to
be unaware of the rebuttable presumption statute, as it was not raised at the trial
court level. While some states are considering including domestic violence issues
on the general bar examination, so far no state has done so. Thus, it is quite
possible for family law attorneys to have had no training on domestic violence.
615. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16206 (West 2000) (mandating
domestic violence training for court-appointed attorneys for children in juvenile
court). While these attorneys do not have the same role as guardians ad litem,
these are similar functions. Both groups should be mandated to have domestic
violence training.
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of the statute, how domestic violence is defined under the statute,
616
how the presumption is raised, and how it is rebutted.
Time needs to be given to any concerns or disagreements on
the part of the participants, as this is an important opportunity to
discuss fundamental beliefs, necessary for any real attitudinal
617
change.
After participating in this very specific and
comprehensive training, it is more likely that these actors will feel a
higher level of comfort with the new statutes and more willing to
apply them on a daily basis, rather than resisting the statutes due to
feeling unsure of how to proceed or because they do not
618
understand the basis for the presumption.
D. Changing Roles of Family Court Services Staff, Mediators, Custody
Evaluators, and Guardians ad Litem
Yet another part of the solution may be changing the role of
mediators employed by Family Court Services staff. In many areas,
the current job description is only to mediate between parents in
contested custody cases. However, increasingly courts are changing
this to provide that these workers should screen for and then
619
They could then report on
investigate any allegations of abuse.
their findings to the court. Mediators are also sometimes directed
to be aware of and refer litigants to community resources such as
domestic violence shelters, legal assistance, and batterers
620
programs.
This type of service is invaluable in cases where the
litigants have no attorneys, which is becoming the norm rather
621
than the exception in family law cases.
616. Such trainings have been provided for court-based mediators and child
custody evaluators by the California Judicial Council. For more information,
contact Julia Weber at the Center for Families, Children, and the Courts,
Administrative Office of the Courts, San Francisco, California. They have also
been provided for judges by the California Commission on Judicial Education and
Research. For more information contact Bobbie Welling, CJER, Administrative
Office of the Courts, San Francisco, California.
617. This is recommended in a thoughtful article discussing how to actually
effect attitudinal change in the family courts on the topic of domestic violence. See
Clare Dalton, When Paradigms Collide: Protecting Battered Parents and Their Children in
the Family Court System, 37 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 273 (July 1999).
618. Id.
619. See, e.g., CAL. RULE OF COURT, R1257.2, which is due to take effect Jan. 1,
2002.
620. Id.
621. A 1997 study by the California Administrative Office of the Courts found
that more than eighty percent of domestic violence cases are handled without
attorneys. Sharon Lerman, Litigants Without Lawyers Flood Courts, 1 CAL. BAR J. 32
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Additionally, in areas where guardians ad litem have decisionmaking power in custody cases, this role needs to be carefully
examined and re-evaluated, as this may be an improper delegation
622
of judicial authority.
In these jurisdictions, legislation, rules of
court, or standards of judicial administration need to be enacted
clarifying the judicial role as opposed to the roles of other
professionals in custody cases.
E. Increased Funding for Attorneys for Low Income Victims of
Domestic Violence
Due to the devastating funding cuts to the Legal Services
Corporation under the twelve years of Presidents Reagan and Bush,
the numbers of free or low cost attorneys available to help poor
623
victims of domestic violence were greatly reduced.
In custody
cases involving domestic violence, victims are at a severe
disadvantage if they are forced to represent themselves, but many
624
have no choice.
If presumption statutes are to be effective, money must be
found for attorneys to handle these complex cases at the trial level.
Additionally, a widespread pro bono project among the private bar
625
needs to be instituted.
In some areas, these attorneys can be
trained by and co-counsel with attorneys employed by Legal
626
While
Services or local non-profit domestic violence agencies.
Congress has earmarked funds for many attorneys to work on civil
627
domestic violence cases around the country, this is still a huge
(2001).
622. Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note 446 (describing an example of
what may have been the improper delegation of such authority).
623. Steve Berenson, Politics and Plurality in a Lawyer’s Choice of Clients: The Case
of Stropnicky v. Nathanson, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 49 (1998) (noting that the
“[l]egal Services Corporation has barely survived elimination, suffering deep
funding reductions and draconian restrictions on the scope of its activities”);
Jessica Pearson, Court Services: Meeting the Needs of Twenty-First Century Families, 33
FAM. L.Q. 617, 620 (1999) (observing that federal appropriations for these
programs have been cut and that both government and private legal assistance
meets only about 20.5 percent of the needs of the poor).
624. Lerman, supra note 6232.
625. For example, the Center for Domestic Violence Prevention, San Mateo,
Ca., has been successfully recruiting and training attorneys from large firms to
handle contested custody cases involving domestic violence at the trial level.
Conversation with Kim Milligan, Attorney for C.D.V.P., Aug. 6, 2001.
626. Id.
627. The Violence Against Women Grants Office, part of the U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, has provided several million dollars in 1999, 2000 and 2001 to non-profit
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and largely unmet need.
F. Using the Appellate Process
In a great many of the appellate decisions discussed above,
courts overturned inappropriate trial court decisions in custody
cases involving domestic violence. And in virtually all the reported
appellate cases cited in this article, both parties were represented
by counsel. Appellate review is how problems with trial court
decisions are supposed to be resolved. Thus, our legal system is
often ineffective if litigants have no access to the appellate courts.
In too many cases, poor victims of domestic violence cannot
afford to file appeals when the family court awards custody to the
batterer. While some Legal Aid agencies will take on such cases,
628
many will not.
Thus, funding must be found for private
representation, or qualified pro bono attorneys must be recruited.
Additionally, attorneys who routinely represent many victims at the
trial court level must be trained to raise the presumption issue
appropriately, laying the foundation for an appeal. And these
attorneys could be encouraged to appeal decisions that appear to
be in violation of the statute.
G. Community Organizing
In addition to the above recommendations, it is often
necessary to organize members of the community before domestic
violence is treated seriously in custody cases. This effort may focus
specifically on the legal community, or may include the larger nonlegal community.
For example, in some cases, judicial training has been
attempted but has not been successful; either it is not mandated, or
629
Thus, another avenue being tried
when it is, few judges attend.
in some jurisdictions is a court watch program, in order to obtain
systematic information about how domestic violence custody cases
agencies around the U.S. to start meeting the civil needs of domestic violence
victims, primarily focusing on family law cases.
628. Yetter E-mail, supra note 614. Ms. Yetter says that Oregon Legal Aid has
not taken any appeals of domestic violence custody cases. Id. She says the priority
at Legal Aid is to take on cases which will create new law. Id. Of course, a well
reasoned appellate decision interpreting a new statute could resolve a lot of
interpretation problems at the trial court level and save Legal Services trial
attorneys much time and trouble.
629. Post E-mail, supra note 526.
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are handled at the trial court level. Once this information is
compiled and analyzed, the hope is that the presiding judge will be
630
more willing to mandate training for the family law judges.
Another example of community organizing on this topic
comes from Minnesota, where the Duluth Abuse Intervention
Project recently conducted and published an extensive report
regarding judicial response to domestic violence, then met with
631
judicial leaders to discuss the findings in the report.
While
judges are barred by codes of ethics from discussing pending or
specific cases, it is appropriate for them to examine the court’s
response in the aggregate. The response from the judiciary to this
632
report and discussion has been positive.
Another way to organize and also to conduct informal training
with attorneys and judges is to work closely with them on policy
committees. For example, when domestic violence attorneys join
and participate in meetings with the family law section of the state
bar, these “mainstream” attorneys become more knowledgeable
about domestic violence issues, and may even become advocates for
633
changing the laws.
An example of organizing within the larger community is an
ongoing project taking place in Durban, Ontario, near Toronto, in
Canada. The domestic violence advocates there have used a
community organizing model to address problems with custody
634
cases involving domestic violence. They started with several focus
630. E-mail from Dianne Post, Attorney, Arizona Coalition Against Domestic
Violence, to author, Professor of Law, University of California at (July 9, 2001)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Post E-mail (3)]. Domestic violence court watch
programs have been conducted in several states, though these usually focus on
criminal cases. See, e.g., Sarah Buel, Family Violence Court Watches: Improving Services
to Victims by Documenting Practices, THE TEXAS PROSECUTOR 16 (July/Aug. 1999).
Minnesota also has a domestic violence court watch program, focusing on criminal
cases; the results are used to inform the public when the judges are running for reelection. Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note 447. For more information
about court watch programs, contact the Battered Women’s Justice Project, 800903-0111.
631. Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note 446.
632. Id.
633. Fredrick Telephone Conversation, supra note 418. Ms. Fredrick joined
the family law section of the Minnesota State Bar and attended many of the
meetings, raising domestic violence issues. Id. After a few years, the State Bar
decided to sponsor the 2001 legislation extending the state rebuttable
presumption to sole custody cases. Id.
634. Deborah Sinclair, et al., In the Center of the Storm: Durham Speaks Out, A
Community Response to Custody and Access Issues Affecting Woman Abuse Survivors and
Their Children (June 2000) at http://www.durhamresponsetowomanabuse.com
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groups of mothers who were involved in such cases, led by a social
635
The findings and recommendations from
worker/researcher.
these groups were then used as the basis for an ongoing working
group and conferences in which survivors, advocates, judges,
636
custody assessors, and others are participating. The results so far
637
have been quite promising.
VI. CONCLUSION
“I have always embraced the idea that the pursuit of a worthy,
deep goal is never for a day or for a year, that the journey is long
and hard, and no one can say how long it will take. You take in all
the information you can, you decide what is right, and once you
make the decision, you pursue it. You commit, with perseverance,
638
steadfastness and faith.”
Ending domestic violence is a monumental task. Effecting any
fundamental changes in the legal system takes great perseverance
and creativity. Enacting statutes creating presumptions against
custody to batterers is not a “quick fix.” It does not solve the
problems presented in these cases overnight. In some areas, it has
actually produced a backlash, making it harder for victims to obtain
restraining orders or limiting the effectiveness of such orders.
However, these difficulties should not discourage states from
enacting statutes creating a presumption against custody to
batterers. First, it appears that the courts that have been dealing
with presumption statutes for the longest period of time seem to be
using them most consistently. It seems that making a change this
fundamental takes many years.
Second, these statutes are designed to protect victims and their
children, and when applied appropriately, they accomplish this
goal. While fully implementing such statutes and dealing with the
backlash in some jurisdictions will take a great deal of work, the
end result is well worth it. The ultimate goals include no longer
enabling batterers to use the family law courts to continue to revictimize their partners, and exposing many fewer children to
ongoing abuse and inappropriate parenting. With steadfastness
and ingenuity, we are slowly but surely moving in that direction.
635. Id.
636. Id.
637. Id.
638. CONGRESSMAN JOHN LEWIS WITH MICHAEL D’ORSO, WALKING WITH
WIND: A MEMOIR OF THE MOVEMENT (1998).
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